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Abstract
Operational excellence is an executional competency that reflects a firm’s ability to run
its day-to-day operations efficiently, effectively, and profitably. Differing views have been
expressed regarding the inner dynamics and value creation potential of operational excellence.
From an inner dynamics perspective, the competency’s dimensions of efficiency and
effectiveness are viewed by some as conflicting and difficult to reconcile (the tradeoff model),
and by others as synergistic and mutually supportive (the cumulative model). From a value
creation perspective, operational excellence is portrayed by some as an effective cash-flow
generator and a potent enabler of firm growth, and by others as a source of excessive
routinization that hinders strategic adaptation and limits long-term value creation. The present
dissertation revisits these conflicting views.
Drawing on Porter’s profit maximization prescription, essay 1 empirically examines the
individual and collective effects of operational efficiency and operational effectiveness on firm
profitability. In so doing, it assesses the respective merits of the tradeoff and cumulative
perspectives. Empirical findings based on a multi-industry panel of 595 public US manufacturing
firms provide relative support for the cumulative perspective; concurrent improvements in
efficiency and effectiveness are shown to have a compounding positive effect on firm
profitability. The findings also show that the individual benefits of isolated improvements to
either efficiency or effectiveness tend to be curvilinear with diminishing returns.
Addressing the value creation question, essay 2 draws on signaling theory to empirically
examine the stock market’s ex-ante assessment of operational excellence as an instrument for
long-term value creation. Contrary to the productivity dilemma narrative, empirical results show
that market participants tend to have a positive outlook on the value creation potential of

operational excellence. The positive outlook is, however, found to be dampened by the stock
market’s expectations of firm short-term revenue growth and amplified by firm R&D efforts.
In a third exploratory essay, I discuss environmental and organizational learning factors
that have the potential to cause firms to grow overinvested in operational excellence at the
expense of strategic foresight and market adaptation. Essay 3 is conceptual in nature and
provides theoretical propositions for future empirical investigation.
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I.

Introduction
Operational excellence is a short-term performance indicator that reflects a firm’s ability

to run its day-to-day operations efficiently, effectively, and profitably (e.g., Kaplan and Norton,
2008; Mentzer et al., 2008; Treacy and Wiersema, 1993). Differing views have been expressed
regarding the inner dynamics and value creation potential of operational excellence.
From an inner dynamics perspective, two views stand out in the literature: the tradeoff
model and the cumulative perspective. The tradeoff model suggests that operational efficiency
and operational effectiveness are conflicting and difficult to reconcile, making it unlikely that
firms outperform on both dimensions simultaneously (e.g., Skinner, 1969; Brumme et al., 2015).
This tradeoff perspective contends that a pragmatic operations strategy is to seek excellence in
one dimension while maintaining the other at or above a critical threshold (Wheelwright and
Bowen, 1996). The cumulative perspective, on the other hand, argues that operational efficiency
and operational effectiveness might be difficult but not impossible to reconcile (Ferdows and De
Meyer, 1990). Invoking the superior performance of Japanese manufacturers on both
dimensions, proponents of the cumulative perspective argue that operations strategy should
facilitate the simultaneous improvement of both efficiency and effectiveness (e.g., Clark, 1996;
Flynn and Flynn, 2004; Heim and Peng, 2010). Essay 1 joins this debate and investigates the
individual and collective effects of operational efficiency and operational effectiveness on firm
profitability. The idea is to determine whether there are limits to focused strategies that aim to
maximize one competency – either efficiency or effectiveness – while maintaining the other at or
above a critical threshold; and evaluate if a simultaneously superior performance on both
competencies can compound firm profitability. Finding empirical support for either conjecture
would strengthen the cumulative perspective and weaken the tradeoff model, and vice versa.
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Based on a panel dataset of 595 US public manufacturing firms and 2,758 firm-year
observations, essay 1 shows that isolated improvements to either efficiency or effectiveness do
indeed result in capped profitability benefits when analyzed across the entire sample; the profit
impact of improving either competency while holding the other constant is found to be
curvilinear with diminishing returns. Alternatively, improving both competencies simultaneously
is shown to have a strictly positive impact on firm profitability, in an indication that firms can
not only improve both efficiency and effectiveness simultaneously but can do so profitably as
well. The two findings provide relative support for the cumulative perspective over the tradeoff
model. However, as I will discuss in detail further into the dissertation, these results may change
more or less significantly as one looks into specific industries individually.
The second thrust of this dissertation concerns the long-term value creation potential of
operational excellence. Differing perspectives exist in this regard as well. On the one hand, the
productivity dilemma literature argues that operational excellence, despite being beneficial in the
short term, is likely to induce routinization dynamics that hinder strategic adaptation and limit
long-term value creation (Adler et al., 2009; Benner and Tushman, 2003). On the other hand,
empirical evidence from the finance and operations management literatures seem to collectively
indicate that operational excellence can be an effective cash-flow generator and a potent enabler
of firm growth and long-term value creation (Fullerton et al., 2003; Myers 1984).
Essay 2 of this dissertation revisits this contentious relationship by investigating the stock
market’s ex ante assessment of operational excellence as an instrument for long-term value
creation. Drawing on signaling theory (Spence, 1973), essay 2 is premised on the idea that
operational excellence signals embedded in financial statements and accompanying notes will
inform the stock market’s assessment of long-term value creation. A key argument is that stock
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market participants will, contrary to the productivity dilemma narrative, view operational
excellence as a positive signal for long-term value creation. This positive assessment is,
however, hypothesized to be contextual and contingent on two factors: (a) the market’s
expectation of firm short-term revenue growth and (b) the firm’s research and development
efforts. Firm revenue growth expectations are suggested to have a dampening effect on the
market’s positive assessment whereas firm R&D efforts are expected to have an amplifying
effect. Empirical results from a panel of 864 publicly traded manufacturing firms in the US and
3,128 firm-year observations over the 2010-2015 time period provide support for the
hypothesized relationships.
A third thrust of this dissertation is to identify conditions under which the pursuit of
operational excellence can cause firms to become overinvested in a narrow set of operations
management capabilities at the expense of strategic foresight and market adaptation. This
exploratory effort is inspired by the productivity dilemma argument suggesting that operational
excellence is most beneficial under stable market conditions (Benner and Tushman, 2003).
Drawing on the organizational learning literature, the central argument in essay 3 is that a firm’s
pursuit of operational excellence may be so effective under stable market conditions that it
causes organizational sense-making to grow biased towards an exaggerated association between
existing operations management capabilities and competitive advantage. Market stability is
argued to serve as a double-edged sword that, on the one hand, provides an ideal environment for
the successful leverage of operations management capabilities and associated operational
excellence and, on the other, causes firms to become overinvested in a narrow set of such
capabilities with negative ramifications on firm strategic foresight and market adaptation.
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II.

Essay 1 – Tradeoff or synergy: The individual and collective effects of efficiency and
effectiveness on firm profitability

Abstract
This research explores the inner dynamics of operational excellence by investigating the
individual and collective effects of operational efficiency and operational effectiveness on firm
profitability. Joining a longstanding debate between the tradeoff and cumulative perspectives, I
draw on Porter’s profit maximization prescription to explore the merits of each. Proponents of
the tradeoff perspective argue that firms may not be able to reconcile efficiency and effectiveness
and that a focus on one or the other is necessary to achieve operations-based competitive
advantage. Supporters of the cumulative perspective, on the other hand, contend that the tradeoff
model may be presenting a false dichotomy; they argue that firms have grown substantially less
constrained to sacrifice one competency in the pursuit of another. Based on a large panel of 595
US public manufacturing firms and 2,758 firm-year observations, the study’s empirical results
suggest that most manufacturers can indeed enhance efficiency and effectiveness simultaneously
– with a compounding positive effect on firm gross margin profitability. The findings also show
that the individual benefits of efficiency and effectiveness are capped when analyzed across the
entire sample but more nuanced when studied within individual industries. Implications for
research and practice are discussed.
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Introduction
For a long time, mainstream thought in operations strategy advocated a focus on either
efficiency or effectiveness as a means to achieve operations-based competitive advantage
(Skinner, 1969). This tradeoff perspective suggested that firms were unlikely to simultaneously
outperform the competition on both efficiency and effectiveness and that a pragmatic strategy
was to seek excellence in one competency while maintaining the other at or above a critical
threshold (Wheelwright and Bowen, 1996).
Numerous studies have since been conducted, and alternative perspectives have emerged.
In their study of European manufacturers, Ferdows and De Meyer (1990) proposed that
efficiency and effectiveness may not be as systematically conflicting as once thought; they
showed that the two competencies can in fact be mutually supportive such that improving one
induces a sequential improvement in the other. The finding spurred discussions that proper
operations strategy may not be one that seeks focused excellence in either efficiency or
effectiveness, but one that cumulatively facilitates superior achievements on both (e.g., Heim and
Peng, 2010).
Research on which of these two perspective holds a higher promise remains inconclusive.
The largest meta-analytic work to date on the tradeoff and cumulative perspectives indicates that
results are too conflicting to draw definitive conclusions (Rosenzweig and Easton, 2010). The
same work shows that most of the extant literature addressing the merits of each perspective is
cross-sectional, survey-based, and draws on key respondents’ perceptions rather than objective
measures of efficiency and effectiveness (e.g., Boyer and Lewis, 2002). Rosenzweig and Easton
(2010) called for longitudinal, objective-measure studies that could help advance the debate on
the inner dynamics of operational excellence as it pertains to efficiency and effectiveness. This
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study responds to that call by investigating the merits of the tradeoff and cumulative
perspectives, respectively, in a longitudinal setting. The study also departs from the surveybased, perceptual approach traditionally used in similar research and relies on objective,
accounting-based measures of efficiency and effectiveness instead.
To assess the merit of each perspective, I draw on Porter’s (1996) profit maximization
prescription. Porter (1996) argues that the pertinence of a firm’s operations strategy is not
determined by whether the strategy facilitates excellence in efficiency, effectiveness, or both; but
by the extent to which the resulting operational achievements translate into profitability. As such,
I empirically investigate the individual and collective effects of efficiency and effectiveness on
firm profitability. The goal is to 1) determine whether there are limits to focused strategies that
aim to maximize one competency – efficiency or effectiveness – while maintaining the other at
or above a critical threshold; and 2) evaluate if a simultaneously superior performance on both
competencies can compound firm profitability.
I develop hypotheses in support of both conjectures and empirically test them on a large
panel of US public manufacturing firms over the 2010-2015 period. Using inventory efficiency
and supply readiness as key indicators of efficiency and effectiveness respectively, this research
provides evidence that the individual profit benefits of efficiency and effectiveness are indeed
capped when analyzed at the sector-level – i.e., across the entire manufacturing sector – but more
nuanced when looked at within individual industries. Empirical findings also show that most
manufacturers experience a compounded positive effect on firm profitability when they enhance
inventory efficiency and supply readiness concurrently. Collectively, these results provide
evidence that efficiency and effectiveness have the potential to synergistically benefit firm
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profitability – in an indication that there may be untapped potential in the cumulative
perspective’s prescription.
This research contributes to the operations strategy literature in several ways. First, it
assesses the financial performance implications of the efficiency-effectiveness duality, thus
empirically evaluating the merits of the tradeoff and cumulative perspectives. In so doing, it
builds on and adds to prior research evaluating the feasibility of concurrent improvements in
efficiency and effectiveness. Second, the study reinforces the cumulative perspective’s
proposition that firms can indeed improve profitability by enhancing both efficiency and
effectiveness simultaneously. This is of particular significance given that many firms still design
their operations for focused excellence in either efficiency or effectiveness on the premise that
“few unfocused factories outperform competitors” (Brumme et al., 2015, p. 1513). Third, this
research provides a longitudinal perspective to the study of tradeoffs in operations strategy, thus
augmenting the various cross-sectional studies on the subject (Boyer et al., 2005). Fourth, it
answers Rosenzweig and Easton’s (2010) call for research that uses objective measures of
efficiency and effectiveness as an alternative to the more commonly used self-report, perceptionbased approach.
From a managerial perspective, the study highlights the benefit of adopting an allencompassing approach to operations strategy where the goal is not to achieve focused
excellence in either efficiency or effectiveness, but to enable superior profitability through a
proper combination of the two competencies. It also provides managers with a simple metric
(i.e., operational ambidexterity) to track the extent to which their firm’s operations strategy
strikes a healthy balance of efficiency and effectiveness.
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Background and hypotheses
The role of operations strategy is to devise and implement organizational processes and
managerial policies that facilitate the efficient and effective execution of firm competitive
strategy (Boyer et al. 2005). Efficiency and effectiveness support firm competitiveness in two
distinct ways. The former enhances cost containment and pricing flexibility; the latter enables
service differentiation and customer value creation (Heikkila, 2002). Although both
competencies are required for the proper fulfillment of a firm’s value creation and value
appropriation mandates (Sirmon et al., 2007), research and practice indicate that most firms
design their operations to maximize one or the other (Parmigiani et al., 2011).
The pervasiveness of this selective approach to operations design is due to two factors:
the primacy of focus when formulating a business-level strategy, and the subordination between
business-level and functional strategies (Wheelwright, 1984). From a strategic focus perspective,
it is recommended that firms define and pursue key competitive priorities rather than try to be
excellent at everything at once. Clark (1996, p.45) suggests that “in every business, firms must
meet minimum standards on all dimensions of customer choice in order to participate effectively.
But firms that try to do everything exceptionally well and fail to develop competitive priorities
will end up second-best compared to those firms that concentrate their efforts.” Business-level
strategic focus is often viewed as a hallmark of the disciplined organization and a prerequisite for
competitive advantage (Clark, 1996).
From a subordination perspective, firms typically formulate strategic plans in a layered
fashion whereby competitive priorities defined at the business-level (a.k.a. competitive strategy)
dictate the scope and content of subordinate functional strategies such as operations strategy. At
the business level, strategizing consists in defining higher-level competencies that need to be
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cultivated in order to position a business for success within a wider competitive landscape
(Schendel and Hofer, 1979). At the functional level, strategizing consists in developing and
aligning key capabilities that facilitate the attainment of the overarching competencies delineated
at the business level (Hambrick, 1980).
Various typologies of business-level strategy have been proposed over the years (e.g.,
Schendel and Hofer, 1979; Miles and Snow, 1978; Wissema et al., 1980). The most studied in
the literature and recognized in practice remains Porter’s (1980) classification of generic
strategies (Gupta and Lonial, 1998). Porter suggests that firms may obtain a competitive
advantage by properly implementing one of two strategies: product/service differentiation or cost
leadership. Depending on which strategy a firm pursues, a greater emphasis may be placed – at
the operations level – on either efficiency or effectiveness. Firms that pursue product/service
differentiation are likely to aim for excellence in effectiveness as a means to create superior
customer value whereas those pursuing cost-leadership will tend to go after excellence in
efficiency as a means to offer competition-comparable value at a lower cost.
While recognizing the primacy of focus at the business level, recent scholarship in
operations strategy suggests that such focus need not trickle down to the functional level
(Rosenzweig and Easton, 2010). With the proliferation of sophisticated process management
practices (e.g., Total Quality Management, Just-In-Time) and advanced manufacturing
techniques (e.g., Computer Aided Manufacturing), operations management scholars argue that
firms are significantly less constrained to sacrifice efficiency to improve effectiveness, or vice
versa (e.g., Blackburn and Scudder, 2009). It is argued that the traditional tradeoff between the
two competencies is no longer systematic (Heim and Peng, 2010) and that firms have greater
flexibility to design their operations for varying combinations of efficiency and effectiveness
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(Brumme et al., 2015). The question is no longer one that asks how to maximize efficiency or
effectiveness in support of a higher-level business strategy, but one that asks what combination
of the two competencies to aim for in order to maximize firm profitability (Porter, 1996).
In the following subsections, I develop a series of hypotheses regarding the individual
and collective effects of efficiency and effectiveness on firm profitability. Individual-effect
hypotheses address the marginal profit impact of each competency (efficiency and effectiveness)
holding the other constant, in line with scenarios where firms pursue excellence in one
competency while maintaining the other at or above a critical threshold. The collective-effect
hypothesis addresses the impact of various combinations of efficiency and effectiveness (i.e.,
various levels of Operational Ambidexterity) on firm profitability.
Efficiency (Inventory Efficiency)
Efficiency is generally defined as the ratio of benefits received to resources expended
(Bordoloi et al., 1999). In operations management, it is construed as a system’s output-to-input
ratio (Priem and Butler, 2001; Ross and Droge, 2004). A versatile performance indicator,
operational efficiency has been adapted “in multiple ways to reflect the range of inputs and
outputs that are of interest to stakeholders involved in the system” (Ding, 2014, p. 2). Prior
research explored such variations as inventory efficiency (Eroglu and Hofer, 2014), production
efficiency (Modi and Mishra, 2011), marketing efficiency (Modi and Mishra, 2011), and timevs. cost-based efficiency (Kortmann et al., 2014). As stated earlier, this study focuses on
inventory efficiency – construed as a firm’s ability to support sales with a minimal amount of
inventory (Mishra et al., 2013). This focus is motivated by a desire to contribute to the traditional
discussion on the a priori tradeoff between inventory efficiency and customer service as an
indicator of operational effectiveness (e.g., Closs et al., 2010).
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Inventory efficiency exerts opposing forces on firm profitability due to its divergent
impacts on cost containment and revenue generation (Shah and Shin, 2007). Higher levels of
efficiency enable firms to reduce inventory-related costs (Modi and Mishra, 2013) but, at the
same time, exacerbate their vulnerability to demand and supply uncertainty (Rumyantsev and
Netessine, 2007).
Whether a firm benefits from efficiency enhancements or not is a function of the firm’s
initial position on the efficiency curve. Eroglu and Hofer (2011) show that higher inventory
efficiency is not necessarily indicative of superior inventory management. While some firms
stand to improve their profitability by cutting inventory (i.e., improving efficiency), others may
achieve a similar outcome by doing the exact opposite – i.e., holding more inventory (Eroglu and
Hofer, 2011). Typically, firms benefit from efficiency enhancements if their initial position is
one reflecting excess inventory (Runyantsev and Netessine, 2007). Such firms can reduce
average inventory holdings and associated costs with barely any related negative impact on
revenue generation.
Interestingly, most firms tend to hold more inventory than they need to (Chen et al.,
2005). The preponderance of behavioral biases such as loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman,
1986) and the bracing bias (Tokar et al., 2014) provide a rationale for this generalized tendency
to overstock. All else equal, inventory managers tend to view shortages as more problematic than
overages (Lee and Siemsen, 2016). While a shortage is typically perceived as a pure loss, an
overage is often downplayed as a mere inconvenience (Lee and Siemsen, 2016). This imbalanced
sensitivity to shortages and overages causes managers to target higher-than-optimal service
levels and induces them to hold more inventory than they need to (Lee and Siemsen, 2016).
From a bracing bias perspective, inventory managers have been shown to overestimate the
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likelihood and magnitude of future demand shocks, with inflationary effects on inventory
holdings (Tokar et al., 2014). They tend to brace themselves against the overestimated risk of
shortage by carrying additional “just-in-case” inventory (Mishra et al., 2013, p. 300).
With such a general bias towards overstocking, I expect efficiency enhancements to yield
profitability gains for the typical firm – at least initially. This expectation is all the more
plausible that efficiency improvements are often accompanied with or enabled by other systemic
enhancements across the organization. For example, Lieberman and Demeester (1999) find that
labor productivity improves when work-in-process inventory is reduced. Cachon and Fisher
(2000) find the profitability benefits of inventory efficiency enhancements to be compounded by
improvements to production scheduling and information sharing.
As stated earlier, however, efficiency improvements are not exclusively beneficial to firm
profitability. As much as they reduce inventory-related costs, they also increase the risk of
shortage (Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005) with a negative impact on revenue generation and firm
profitability (Hendricks and Singhal, 2003). In addition, inventory-related costs typically decline
linearly with each unit reduction in average inventory holdings whereas the risk of shortage
increases exponentially (Rumyantsev and Netessine, 2007). As such, I expect incremental
efficiency improvements to result in positive but declining marginal profitability gains. I
therefore posit that:
H1: Inventory efficiency will be positively associated with firm profitability, but at a
declining rate.
Effectiveness (Supply Readiness)
Firms are operationally effective to the extent that they provide a source of supply that
meets or exceeds customer expectations (e.g., Heikkila, 2002; Hitt et al., 2016; Pagel et al.,
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2015). Inherently multidimensional, operational effectiveness encompasses indicators such as
conformance quality, production flexibility, and fulfillment speed (Rosenzweig and Roth, 2004).
In this study, I focus on the latter two indicators as key capabilities underlying a firm’s ability to
readily meet customer demand – a concept that I henceforth call supply readiness.
Supply readiness confers time-based competitive advantage (Stalk, 1988). It facilitates
superior customer value creation through the fast conversion of customer orders into deliveries
(Heim et al., 2014). In a business environment where the intrinsic attributes of most product
offerings can be replicated relatively easily (Daugherty and Pittman, 1995), supply readiness
stands as a meaningful differentiator in the marketplace. All else equal, customers typically favor
suppliers with shorter lead-times (Heim et al., 2014). This is partly due to the substantial cost
penalties that arise from transacting with less responsive suppliers. Stalk (1988) argues that long
lead times require equally long forecast horizons, result in poorer forecast accuracy, exacerbate
uncertainty, increase hedging costs (e.g., safety stock requirements), and induce organizational
rigidity. As such, suppliers with greater leadtime compression capabilities tend to be in high
demand and are often in a position to command premium pricing (Heim et al., 2014; Li and Lee,
1994). Supply readiness is, therefore, a valuable core competency that strengthens firm
competitiveness, fosters customer loyalty, enhances market power, and facilitates market share
gains (Tu et al., 2006) – with a positive impact on revenue generation and firm profitability.
Supply readiness is, however, costly to develop. To support leadtime compression efforts,
firms have to cultivate intra- and inter-organizational production flexibility capabilities
commensurate with the level of supply readiness that they aim to achieve (Ketokivi, 2006).
Depending on how wide a range of probable demand realizations a firm wants to accommodate,
different levels of “investments in excess capacity [including inventory holdings], empty floor
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space, and slack time in the production schedule” may be needed (Gerwin, 1993, p. 406).
Naturally, the more such investments a firm makes, the lower its marginal return due to the
exponentially declining probability of extreme demand realizations. As such, I posit that:
H2: Supply readiness will be positively associated with firm profitability, but at a
declining rate.
Operational Ambidexterity
While both efficiency and effectiveness have the potential to individually benefit firm
profitability, many scholars argue that firms have grown significantly less constrained to pursue
excellence in just one or the other (e.g., Blackburn and Scudder, 2009). Various technological
advances have made the simultaneous enhancement of efficiency and effectiveness possible,
with a compounding effect on the competencies’ profit impact (Heim and Peng, 2010).
Mishra et al. (2013) suggest that information technology’s (IT) role in facilitating intraand inter-organizational collaboration has enabled firms to reconcile efficiency and effectiveness
in unprecedented ways. Programs such as electronic data interchange (EDI), vendor managed
inventory (VMI), radio frequency identification (RFID), and collaborative planning, forecasting,
and replenishment (CPFR) are examples of IT-enabled initiatives that facilitate such
reconciliation. Advanced manufacturing technologies (AMT) are also credited with enabling the
concurrent improvement of efficiency and effectiveness (Blackburn and Scudder, 2009). AMTs
have, for example, helped propagate the practice of delayed product differentiation and mass
customization. Also referred to as postponement, delayed product differentiation enables firms to
enhance both inventory efficiency and supply readiness by using standard components across
various product lines at early stages of the production process and leaving final customization till
later stages when demand signals are stronger and more reliable (Feitzinger and Lee, 1997).
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The principal benefit of these technological advances is not that they eliminate the
tradeoff frontier but that they shift it in a way that gives firms an opportunity to design their
operations for a wider range of combinations of efficiency and effectiveness (e.g., Adler et al.,
1999; Hayes and Pisano, 1996; Rosenzweig and Easton, 2010). Over time, firms gradually
internalize and leverage available technologies and best practices in an effort to progress towards
the new tradeoff frontier (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). As they do so, some put greater emphasis
on efficiency (e.g., A0A1 in Figure 1), while others prioritize effectiveness (e.g., A0A2).
Although these choices do not preclude the simultaneous improvement of efficiency and
effectiveness the way a pure tradeoff scenario would, they reflect second-order tradeoffs – i.e.,
tradeoffs not between the competencies per se, but between the rates at which each competency
is enhanced (Hayes and Pisano, 1996).

Figure 1 – Tradeoff Frontier Shift – Adapted from Hayes and Pisano (1996)

As they internalize available technologies and best practices, I argue that firms that adjust
their operations to maximize the combined levels of efficiency and effectiveness, rather than
focusing on either in isolation, stand to achieve the greatest profitability gain. Since both
competencies are subject to the law of diminishing returns (Schmenner and Swink, 1998)
17

whereby exponentially larger investments are required to marginally enhance each, I argue that
the fastest and most profitable trajectory to the tradeoff frontier is likely to be one where
efficiency and effectiveness are enhanced concurrently rather than exclusively or sequentially. In
other words, I argue that a concurrent one-unit improvement in each competency will be faster to
achieve and more profitable than a two-unit improvement in either efficiency or effectiveness in
isolation.
Operational Ambidexterity is proposed as a construct that reflects a firm’s ability to
approach that optimal combination of efficiency and effectiveness through the superior
internalization and assimilation of available technologies and best practices. Note that maximal
ambidexterity is not necessarily achieved by merely reaching the tradeoff frontier. Maximal
ambidexterity is attained by positioning the firm at that unique equilibrium along the tradeoff
frontier where a marginal enhancement in efficiency is offset by a resulting deterioration in
effectiveness, or vice versa. Such equilibrium indicates that a firm has taken full advantage of the
available technologies and best practices such that no further improvement is possible. I propose
that the closer a firm gets to that perfect equilibrium, the more profitable it becomes. I, therefore,
posit that:
H3: Operational ambidexterity will be positively associated with firm profitability. That
is, firm profitability is greater the higher the joint levels of inventory efficiency and
supply readiness.
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The study’s hypotheses are summarized in in Figure 21.

Figure 2 – Conceptual Model
Inventory Efficiency

H1 (∩)
Firm Profitability

H3 (+)
Supply Readiness

H2 (∩)

Controls:
Firm Assets
M&A Activity
Firm Market Share
Competitive Intensity
Competitive Instability

Data and measurement
To test the proposed hypotheses, a large panel dataset was compiled from Standard &
Poor's COMPUSTAT database following the procedure outlined in Figure 3.
Figure 3 – Sampling procedure
Manufacturing firms (NAICS 31-33)
R&D-to-sales ratio ≤ 1
Order Backlog <> N/A
Inventory <> N/A

Final sample = 595 firms and 2,758 firm-year observations

1

The joint effect corresponds to Operational Ambidexterity as discussed in Hypothesis 3.
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The initial sample consisted of all public manufacturing firms (i.e., NAICS codes 31-33)
listed in the US between 2010 and 2015. I chose the manufacturing sector for the purpose of
continuity with and comparability within the extant research on operations strategy, which
happens to focus largely on the manufacturing sector (e.g., Boyer et al., 2005). The sampling
period was chosen because it corresponds to the most recent time window that is long-enough for
the purpose of this study and void of major exogenous shocks that could otherwise influence the
relationships under investigation. I elected to start the sampling period in 2010 to avoid any
confounding effects from the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Judging by the US stock market’s
performance, the US economy started to show the first signs of turnaround in the first semester
of 2009, which marked the lowest post-crisis point of the S&P 500 index (Milesi-Ferretti and
Tille, 2011). From an initial sample of 3,408 firms and 15,986 firm-year observations, I
proceeded to exclude firms that had an R&D-to-sales ratio greater than 1. Firms with such a high
R&D intensity ratio tend to have negligible manufacturing operations and are typically viewed as
research firms despite being classified as manufacturing firms in the COMPUSTAT database
(e.g., Gentry and Shen, 2013). Excluding them from the analysis helps to limit undue effects on
the relationships of interest in this study. I also erred on the side of conservatism by excluding
observations with missing order backlog data (a key independent variable). An alternative
approach could have been to replace missing data with zero values assuming that missing values
reflect situations where backlogs are either negligible or indeed zero. This less conservative
approach is sometimes used to treat missing R&D expenditure data (e.g., Anderson et al., 2012;
Ortiz-Molina, 2006) but was deemed inadequate for this study. After this screening procedure,
the final sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 595 firms totaling 2,758 firm-year
observations. Figure 4 provides the breakdown of sampled firms by 3-digit NAICS code.
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Although the sample spans a wide range of manufacturing industries, it remains dominated by
the Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing and Machinery Manufacturing industries
that collectively represent 61% of sampled firms. This skewed distribution is not by design. The
skewness is reflective of the underlying population of public manufacturing firms in the
COMPUSTAT universe as well as the uneven pervasiveness of backlogs across industries in the
manufacturing sector. Order backlogs are most commonly seen in durable goods and computer
manufacturing (Rajgopal et al., 2003), hence the relatively strong representation of those
industries in the study’s sample.
Figure 4 – Number of sampled firms by industry

Dependent variable
Firm Profitability is operationalized using firm gross margin (GM), calculated as follows:
GM 

Sales COGS
Sales
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where Salesit and COGSit correspond respectively to annual revenues and cost of goods sold of
firm i in year t.
Gross margin is chosen over alternative measures of profitability commonly used in the
literature because it is considered the purest indicator of a firm’s ability (or lack thereof) to
capture value from operations through the proper leverage of efficiency and effectiveness as
conceptualized in this study. Profit metrics that extend beyond gross margin (e.g., operating
income, net income, etc.) account for discretionary items such as R&D expenditures and interest
expenses that confound the true profit impact of a firm’s purely operational choices.
Independent variables
Inventory Efficiency (INVEFF) is measured using the following adaptation of inventoryto-sales ratio were Invit refers to end-of-year inventory of firm i in year t:
INVEFF  1

Inv
Sales

The adapted measure is chosen over the more commonly used inventory turns metric
because it facilitates a more intuitive operationalization of the operational ambidexterity
construct (discussed later) conceptualized as the interaction between inventory efficiency and
supply readiness. I use (1 – inventory-to-sales) so that higher values of INVEFF reflect higher
levels of efficiency. This facilitates the intuitive interpretability of results.
Supply Readiness (READINESS), conceptualized as a firm’s ability to readily meet
customer demand, is operationalized using an adapted version of Bharadwaj et al.’s (2007) ontime ratio:
READINESS 

Sales
Sales + Backlog 
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Backlogs are inversely related to a firm’s ability to readily meet customer demand as they
represent customer orders that are booked but not filled by the end of a fiscal period – e.g., fiscal
year (Rajgopal et al., 2003). Large backlogs suggest that an equally large portion of a firm’s total
demand (i.e., Sales + Backlog) was not filled immediately upon order receipt. As such, larger
backlogs are indicative of lower levels of supply readiness.
Operational Ambidexterity (OPAMB) is operationalized as the interaction between
inventory efficiency and supply readiness, in line with the commonly used multiplicative
operationalization of organizational ambidexterity in the management literature (e.g., Gibson and
Birkinshaw, 2004; Cao et al., 2009). Operational Ambidexterity reflects a firm’s ability to take
advantage of available technologies and operational best practices such that a superior level of
combined efficiency (inventory efficiency) and effectiveness (supply readiness) is achieved.
OPAMB is operationalized as follows:
OPAMB  INVEFF x READINESS 

Sales Inv
Sales + Backlog 

The simplified equation above shows that operational ambidexterity is enhanced as long
as a reduction in inventory (i.e., higher efficiency) is accompanied by – at worst – a less than
proportionate increase in backlogs (i.e., lower readiness), or a reduction in backlogs (i.e., higher
readiness) is accompanied by – at worst – a less than proportionate increase in average inventory
holdings (i.e., lower efficiency).
Control variables
I control for firm- and industry-level factors known to influence firm profitability. At the
firm level, I include a log-transformation of firm total assets (ASSETit) as a means to account for
the impact of firm size on firm financial performance (e.g., Eroglu and Hofer, 2011). I also
control for mergers and acquisitions by creating a dummy variable (MNAit) coded as 1 if the
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focal firm engages in M&A activities during fiscal year t, and zero otherwise. Although most
acquisitions account for no more than 5% of a firm’s total assets (Montgomery and Wilson,
1986), they can at times constitute major transitional events that undermine the temporal
comparability of firm accounting data (Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 2011). Lastly, I control for
firm market share (MKTSHAREit) for its impact on firm profitability (e.g., Szymanski et al.,
1993).
At the industry level, I control for competitive intensity (COMPINTENSITYit) which I
measure using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) (e.g., Ramaswamy, 2001). Since HHI is
often construed as an indicator of industry concentration and competitive structure (e.g., Barnett,
1997), I include an additional rivalry-based control that captures the extent to which individualfirm market shares vary from year to year. This competitive dynamics control
(COMPINSTABILITYit) is measured using year-over-year absolute change in HHI per 6-digit
NAICS code.
Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations for the entire sample as well as the top two
sampled industries (61% of sampled firms) are provided in Table 1.
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Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Correlations
All Sample
Variable
Obs. Mean
s.d.
Min
Max
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1 . GM
2758 0.376 0.191 (4.677)
0.939
2 . INVEFF
2758 0.815 0.122 (0.589)
0.999 0.189*
3 . READINESS
2758 0.759 0.182 0.035 1.000 0.282* 0.243*
2758 3.546 10.494 <0.001 113.481 -0.001 0.208* -0.152*
4 . ASSET (in $bil.)†
5 . MNA
2758 0.196 0.397 0.000 1.000 -0.004 0.067* -0.009 0.224*
6 . MKTSHARE
2758 0.169 0.287 <0.001 1.000 -0.185* 0.122* -0.074* 0.366* 0.076*
7 . COMPINTENSITY
2758 3,898 2,531
481 10,000 -0.209* 0.062* -0.092* 0.034 0.011 0.633*
8 . COMPINSTABILITY 2758
276
489 0.000 5,889 -0.046* -0.030
-0.046* -0.073* 0.000 0.035 0.151*
Operational Ambidexterity is not included since it is operationalized as the interaction of INVEFF and READINESS.
† Correlation coefficients based on log-transformed values of firm total assets for consistency with the empirical analysis.
* Significant at the 0.05 level
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Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Correlations (Cont.)
Computer & Electronic Product Manufacturing
Variable
Obs. Mean
s.d.
Min
Max
1
1 . GM
1170 0.441 .157 (0.250)
0.939
2 . INVEFF
1170 0.827 0.105 0.203 0.999 0.200*
3 . READINESS
1170 0.781 0.161 0.172 1.000 0.267*
1170 2.863 9.057 0.001 113.481 0.087*
4 . ASSET (in $bil.)†
5 . MNA
1170 0.174 0.379 0.000 1.000 -0.036
6 . MKTSHARE
1170 0.060 0.155 <0.001 1.000 -0.064*
7 . COMPINTENSITY
1170 3,004 1,976
481 10,000 -0.196*
8 . COMPINSTABILITY 1170
259
386 0.000 5,846 -0.008

2

0.160*
0.374*
0.081*
0.172*
-0.009
0.019

3

-0.077*
-0.007
-0.062*
-0.019
0.015

4

5

6

7

0.228*
0.506* 0.086*
-0.054 -0.053 0.324*
-0.082* -0.018 0.007 0.371*

Machinery Manufacturing
Variable
Obs. Mean
s.d.
Min
Max
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1 . GM
534 0.351 0.148 (1.403)
0.698
2 . INVEFF
534 0.796 0.121 (0.537)
0.973 0.093*
3 . READINESS
534 0.746 0.155 0.035 0.975 0.274* 0.217*
534
4.044 10.938 0.001 89.356 0.071 0.260* 0.147*
4 . ASSET (in $bil.)†
5 . MNA
534 0.217 0.413 0.000 1.000 0.057 0.102* 0.051 0.209*
6 . MKTSHARE
534 0.201 0.280 <0.001 1.000 -0.068 0.156* 0.145* 0.368* 0.048
7 . COMPINTENSITY
534 4,169 2,145 1,690 10,000 -0.042 0.024
-0.062 -0.213* -0.021 0.548*
8 . COMPINSTABILITY 534
307
531 0.000 5,889 -0.132* -0.043
-0.174* -0.130* 0.029 0.095* 0.255*
Operational Ambidexterity is not included since it is operationalized as the interaction of INVEFF and READINESS.
† Correlation coefficients based on log-transformed values of firm total assets for consistency with the empirical analysis.
* Significant at the 0.05 level
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Model specification and estimation
Three hypotheses are proposed in this paper. The first two suggest that the respective
effects of inventory efficiency and supply readiness (effectiveness) on firm gross margin will be
positive and curvilinear with diminishing returns. One way to test for such effects is to perform a
quadratic polynomial regression, and assess whether the linear and quadratic coefficients of
inventory efficiency and supply readiness are statistically significant and positive and negative,
respectively. The third hypothesis suggests that operational ambidexterity will be positively
related to firm gross margin profitability. Support for this third hypothesis is ascertained if the
coefficient of the interaction between Inventory Efficiency and Supply Readiness is positive and
statistically significant. The following equation provides the mathematical formulation of the
model, with Xit representing a vector of control variables:
GM = μ + β% INVEFF + β& READINESS + β' INVEFF & + β( READINESS & + β) OPAMB
+ δX  + ε
Given the panel structure of the dataset used in this study, determining the appropriate
estimation procedure require that I first test for the presence of panel effects. To that end, I ran
the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (BPLM) test, which assesses the null hypothesis that the
variance across units (firms in this case) is zero. With a χ2 statistic equal to 2,137 (pvalue<0.0001), the BPLM test rejected the null – thus confirming the presence of panel effects
and indicating that a simple OLS regression may not be appropriate due to a lack of
independence among observations. I also ran a Wooldridge Lagrange Multiplier test for panel
autocorrelation, but no evidence for serial correlation of residuals was found (F-statistic =2.702;
p-value=0.101).
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Besides panel effects and serial correlation, I also recognize the risk of omitted variable
bias. Many unmeasured phenomena can influence the outcome of interest (firm profitability)
beyond the independent variables included in the model. Failing to account for such phenomena
can cause coefficient estimates to be biased. To mitigate that risk, I use fixed-effects modeling,
which mean-centers the original data within each panel (firm in this case) then runs an ordinaryleast-squares estimation on the transformed dataset. This fixed effects procedure accounts for
time-constant, unobserved heterogeneity across panels and significantly reduces the risk of
omitted variable bias (Kennedy, 2003). Fixed effects models are also appropriate, unlike
random-effects models, when the researcher is interested in estimating within-panel, short-run
relationships (Kennedy, 2003) – as is the case in this study. I am particularly interested in
understanding how a typical firm’s profitability evolves as a function of efficiency, effectiveness,
and operational ambidexterity year over year – which corresponds to within (as opposed to
between) variance.
Results
Table 2 provides the study’s empirical results at different levels of granularity. Panels A
show aggregate, sector-level results for the entire sample. Panels B and C provide more granular,
industry-level results for the two most represented industries in the sample: Computer and
Electronic Product Manufacturing and Machinery Manufacturing, respectively. All results are
discussed next, one hypothesis at a time.
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Table 2 - Estimation Results; DV = Firm Gross Margin
All Sample
Variables
A1
A2
INVEFF
0.388 ***
0.493 ***
(0.034)
(0.060)
READINESS
-0.045
0.264 *
(0.035)
(0.144)
INVEFF^2
-0.125 **
(0.053)
READINESS^2
-0.232 **
(0.108)
OPAMB
ASSET
MNA
MKTSHARE
COMPINTENSITY †
COMPINSTABILITY †
Intercept

0.040 ***
(0.007)
0.001
(0.005)
-0.015
(0.037)
0.017
(0.032)
-0.034
(0.042)
-0.154 **
(0.060)

0.040 ***
(0.007)
0.000
(0.005)
-0.016
(0.037)
0.013
(0.032)
-0.031
(0.042)
-0.249 ***
(0.071)

A3
-0.013
(0.077)
-0.142
(0.146)
-0.247
(0.053)
-0.520
(0.109)
1.036
(0.102)
0.035
(0.007)
0.001
(0.005)
-0.013
(0.036)
0.023
(0.032)
-0.023
(0.041)
0.110
(0.078)

***
***
***
***

R2
0.06
0.07
0.11
20.87 ***
17.54 ***
26.91 ***
F-statistic
# of Observations
2758
2758
2758
# of Firms
595
595
595
Standard errors between parentheses; *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
† Coefficient estimates multiplied by 10,000 to facilitate readability.
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Table 2 - Estimation Results; DV = Firm Gross Margin (Cont.)
Computer & Electronic Product Mfg
Variables
B1
B2
B3
INVEFF
0.206 ***
0.178
0.187
(0.028)
(0.123)
(0.124)
READINESS
-0.100 ***
-0.012
0.012
(0.024)
(0.106)
(0.113)
INVEFF^2
0.018
0.044
(0.089)
(0.099)
READINESS^2
-0.065
-0.045
(0.076)
(0.083)
OPAMB
-0.067
(0.111)
ASSET
0.029 ***
0.029 ***
0.029 ***
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.005)
MNA
-0.002
-0.002
-0.002
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.004)
MKTSHARE
-0.095
-0.094
-0.094
(0.067)
(0.067)
(0.067)
COMPINTENSITY †
0.029
0.029
0.028
(0.028)
(0.021)
(0.021)
COMPINSTABILITY †
0.032
0.030
0.031
(0.037)
(0.037)
(0.037)
***
***
Intercept
0.177
0.160
0.147 **
(0.042)
(0.060)
(0.064)
R2
0.08
0.08
0.08
11.36 ***
8.90 ***
8.04 ***
F-statistic
# of Observations
1170
1170
1170
# of Firms
256
256
256
Standard errors between parentheses; *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
† Coefficient estimates multiplied by 10,000 to facilitate readability.
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Table 2 - Estimation Results; DV = Firm Gross Margin (Cont.)
Machinery Mfg
Variables
C1
C2
C3
INVEFF
0.241 ***
-0.219 ***
-0.271
(0.046)
(0.066)
(0.067)
READINESS
0.067
1.837 ***
1.659
(0.056)
(0.218)
(0.222)
INVEFF^2
0.381 ***
-0.024
(0.060)
(0.134)
READINESS^2
-1.310 ***
-1.634
(0.154)
(0.180)
OPAMB
0.890
(0.264)
ASSET
0.033 ***
0.038 ***
0.032
(0.012)
(0.011)
(0.011)
MNA
-0.001
0.000
0.001
(0.008)
(0.007)
(0.007)
MKTSHARE
-0.032
-0.587
-0.060
(0.065)
(0.058)
(0.057)
COMPINTENSITY †
-0.040
-0.036
-0.028
(0.053)
(0.048)
(0.048)
COMPINSTABILITY † -0.086
-0.101
-0.097
(0.094)
(0.050)
(0.049)
***
Intercept
-0.077
-0.549
-0.423
(0.094)
(0.102)
(0.107)

***
***

***
***
***

***

R2
0.10
0.28
0.29
6.43 ***
17.51 ***
17.29 ***
F-statistic
# of Observations
534
534
534
# of Firms
110
110
110
Standard errors between parentheses; *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
† Coefficient estimates multiplied by 10,000 to facilitate readability.
Table 3 - Summary of hypothesis-testing results

Supported

Computer &
Electronic Product
Mfg
Partially Supported

Partially Supported

Supp. Readiness (∩)

Supported

n.s

Supported

Op. Ambidexterity (+)

Supported

n.s

Supported

Hypothesis

Testing Variable
(expectation)

All
Sample

1

Inv. Efficiency (∩)

2
3

Machinery Mfg
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Hypothesis 1: Inventory Efficiency and Gross Margin Profitability
Hypothesis 1 proposed that inventory efficiency would have a positive effect on firm
profitability but with diminishing returns. Results from panels A1 and A2 provide support for the
hypothesized relationship at the sector level. The coefficient estimate of inventory efficiency is
positive and statistically significant (β1=0.388; p-value<0.001), and that of the associated
quadratic term is significantly negative (β3=-0.125; p-value=0.019). Results at the industry-level
are slightly more nuanced. For the computer and electronic product manufacturing industry,
results show that the effect of efficiency on firm gross margin profitability is indeed positive
(β1=0.206; p-value<0.001). However, no evidence for a curvilinear relationship is found
(β3=0.018; p-value=0.838). Inventory efficiency appears to have a strictly linear effect on firm
profitability, thus providing partial support for H1. In the machinery manufacturing industry,
panels C1 and C2 show inventory efficiency to have a positive and strengthening effect on gross
margin profitability as evidenced by the coefficients of the linear (β1=0.241; p-value<0.001) and
quadratic inventory efficiency terms (β3=0.381; p-value<0.001). This goes partially counter to
the hypothesized relationship, which proposed a positive but declining profit impact. H1 is,
therefore, only partially supported for the machinery manufacturing industry.
Hypothesis 2: Supply Readiness and Gross Margin Profitability
Hypothesis 2 proposed that supply readiness (an indicator of operational effectiveness)
would have a positive curvilinear effect with diminishing returns on firm profitability. Results
from panels A1 and A2 provide support for the hypothesized relationship at the sector level as
evidenced by the positive and negative coefficient estimates of supply readiness for the linear
(β2=0.264; p-value=0.067) and quadratic (β4=-0.232; p-value=0.032) terms, respectively. The
hypothesis is, however, not supported for the computer and electronic product manufacturing
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industry (cf. panel B1). Manufacturers in this industry tend to have strictly negative returns to
improvements in supply readiness (β2=-0.1; p-value<0.001). This is somewhat surprising given
the industry’s fast-paced, hyper-competitive environment where one would expect rapid
customer order fulfillment to provide a significant competitive edge. At the same time, one could
speculatively rationalize the surprising finding based on the possible cost penalty of having
obsolescence-prone slack capacity. Lastly, the hypothesis is supported for the machinery
manufacturing industry judging by the coefficient estimates of the linear (β2=1.837; pvalue<0.001) and quadratic (β4=-1.31; p-value<0.001) terms of supply readiness.
Hypothesis 3: Operational Ambidexterity and Gross Margin Profitability
Hypothesis 3 suggested that operational ambidexterity (i.e., a firm’s ability to enhance
both inventory efficiency and supply readiness concurrently) would have a positive effect on
firm profitability. Empirical results show the hypothesized relationship to be supported at the
sector level, as evidenced by a positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate of
operational ambidexterity in panel A3 (β5=1.036; p-value<0.001). This sample-wide result is,
however, not confirmed for the computer and electronic product manufacturing industry
(β5=-0.067; p-value=0.546). While the finding fails to provide support for the cumulative
perspective in this specific industry, it does not offer support for the tradeoff perspective either.
It shows, together with results from panel B1, that computer and electronic product
manufacturers tend to be penalized for enhancing supply readiness – whether that is undertaken
in isolation or in conjunction with concomitant improvements to inventory efficiency. In
contrast, machinery manufacturers are shown to significantly benefit from the simultaneous
improvement of efficiency and effectiveness, in line with results from the manufacturing sector
at large (β5=0.890; p-value=0.001). All in all, the empirical results show that manufacturing
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firms can, to a large extent, successfully reconcile efficiency and effectiveness (r=0.243; pvalue<0.001) with a positive compounded impact on firm gross margin profitability. Table 3
provides a summary of all hypothesis-testing results.
Discussion and conclusion
This research explored the inner dynamics of operational excellence by investigating the
individual and collective effects of operational efficiency and operational effectiveness on firm
profitability. In so doing, it assessed the respective merits of two major perspectives in
operations strategy: the tradeoff and cumulative perspectives. Whereas the former views
efficiency and effectiveness as mutually exclusive and, thus, difficult to enhance simultaneously
(Skinner, 1969); the latter considers the two competencies to be mutually supportive and
amenable to concurrent improvements – implying that the tradeoff perspective may be premised
on a false dichotomy (Ferdows and De Meyer, 1990; Blackburn and Scudder, 2009).
The study’s main thrust was to determine which of the two perspectives held a higher
promise. To that end, I drew on Porter’s (1980) profit maximization prescription suggesting that
the pertinence of a firm’s operations strategy is not determined by whether the strategy facilitates
excellence in efficiency, effectiveness, or both; but by the extent to which the operational
achievements that it facilitates translate into firm profitability. Within this profit maximization
framework, the tradeoff perspective would be superior if efficiency and effectiveness had an
uncapped profit potential individually, but a negative profit impact collectively. The cumulative
perspective, on the other hand, would be superior if concurrent enhancements of efficiency and
effectiveness (i.e., operational ambidexterity) had a positive impact on firm profitability.
Because of the relative dominance of two industries in the sample, empirical analyses
were conducted at two levels of granularity: at the sector level (i.e., across the entire
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manufacturing sector, as sampled) and at the industry level for the dominating industries –
computer and electronic product manufacturing and machinery manufacturing.
At the sector level, empirical results clearly indicated the superiority of the cumulative
perspective. The individual effects of efficiency and effectiveness on firm profitability were
found to be positive and curvilinear with diminishing returns. In other words, individual
enhancements to either competency in isolation tended to improve firm profitability only up to a
point. Beyond that point further improvements resulted in negative marginal returns. For
example, the marginal profitability benefit of supply readiness (a key indicator of effectiveness)
was found to be positive up to a score of 0.571 (for a sample range of 0.035 to 1) and
increasingly negative beyond that point. As per the profit impact of concurrent enhancements in
efficiency and effectiveness, empirical results provided evidence for a synergistic effect of
operational ambidexterity, thus lending support to the cumulative perspective over the tradeoff
model.
At the industry level, results were noticeably more nuanced. Evidence from the computer
and electronic product manufacturing industry showed no support for either the tradeoff model
or the cumulative perspective, as operational ambidexterity had no significant impact on firm
profitability. Individually, however, inventory efficiency had a strictly linear positive effect on
profitability while supply readiness had a strictly negative impact. As mentioned earlier, this
result was surprising but not implausible. The computer and electronic product manufacturing
industry is notorious for its rapid technological progress and inordinate risk of obsolescence. In
such an environment, a lack of efficiency is likely to translate into frequent and substantial writeoffs with material negative effects on firm profitability. Heavy investments in infrastructure that
enables supply readiness may also put a heavy burden on firm profitability with no guarantee
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that the infrastructure remains relevant long enough for there to be a satisfactory return on
investment. For example, when technologically more advanced offerings from the competition
caused Sony’s sales in the personal computer market to fall short of projections in 2013, the
company had to write inventory down by more than $300 million with a substantial negative
impact on profitability (Tabuchi, 2014). The company had to also revamp its supply readiness
infrastructure to better synchronize its operations with changing market dynamics, with an even
greater loss in profitability. Form an initial projection of an annual profit of $500 million, the
company revised its outlook to a loss of $1.3 billion (Tabuchi, 2014).
Empirical results from the machinery manufacturing industry, on the other hand,
provided support for the cumulative perspective, in line with sector-level findings. Operational
ambidexterity was found to offer synergistic benefits as indicated by the compounded positive
impact of concurrent improvements in inventory efficiency and supply readiness on firm
profitability.
The present study contributes to the operations strategy literature in several ways. First, it
reinforces the cumulative perspective’s proposition that firms can indeed profitably enhance
efficiency and effectiveness simultaneously. This is of particular significance given that most
firms still design their operations for focused excellence in either efficiency or effectiveness on
the premise that “few unfocused factories outperform competitors” (Brumme et al., 2015, p.
1513). At the same time, the study shows that all industries do not benefit from operational
ambidexterity in the same fashion, if at all. For example, firm profitability in the computer and
electronic product manufacturing industry is not impacted by operational ambidexterity, neither
positively nor negatively. This nuanced finding – relative to the strong support for ambidexterity
as an enabler of firm profitability at the sector level – seems to indicate that industry-level factors
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such as competitive dynamics and average product lifecycle may act as salient contingencies
affecting the differential pertinence of the tradeoff and cumulative perspectives, respectively.
Future research may explore this possibility at a more granular level.
Second, the study goes beyond the traditional question of feasibility addressed by most of
the relevant literature; it provides a performance-based assessment of operational ambidexterity.
Prior research had mostly been concerned with the face validity of ambidexterity as an
evolutionary practice from the more traditional tradeoff approach, with only minimal attention
given to the practice’s profit impact. While that provides valuable insights and helps to evaluate
the appeal and potential adoption of the cumulative perspective, it may not be effective in
establishing the perspective’s pertinence – at least not as much as providing evidence for a
significant profit impact would.
Third, it answers Rosenzweig and Easton’s (2010) call for a longitudinal perspective to
the study of tradeoffs (or lack thereof) in operations strategy. It also answers the same authors’
call for research that uses objective measures of efficiency and effectiveness as an alternative to
the more commonly used self-report, perception-based approach.
From a managerial perspective, the evidence provided for a positive impact of
operational ambidexterity on firm profitability has the potential to shift mindsets and encourage a
more encompassing approach to strategy formulation in operations management. The study’s
findings, in conjunction with prior research highlighting the conceptual appeal of the cumulative
perspective, are likely to spur more initiatives aimed at reconciling efficiency and effectiveness
for enhanced firm profitability. In addition to the strategy formulation implications, the proposed
measurement for operational ambidexterity provides a simple and easy-to-use metric that can
facilitate strategic control. Managers can use the metric to compare their firm’s ability to
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reconcile efficiency and effectiveness with industry benchmarks as well as against the firm’s
own historical realizations.
Besides the abovementioned contributions, this study has a few limitations that could be
alleviated in future research. First, by using a backlog-based operationalization of supply
readiness, the study de facto overlooks manufacturing industries where backlogs are not common
practice. This limitation reduces the generalizability of findings to industries beyond the ones
considered in the study. Future research may consider alternate measures of supply readiness that
would enable a more comprehensive sampling for stronger external validity. Second, the
research addresses the tradeoff and cumulative perspectives based on inventory efficiency and
supply readiness as key indicators of operational efficiency and operational effectiveness. As
discussed, there are other indicators of efficiency and effectiveness such as conformance quality
and production efficiency that the study does not investigate. Future research may look into
tradeoffs among other indicators to augment the findings of this study and further enhance our
understanding of the merits of operations strategy’s tradeoff and cumulative perspectives
respectively.
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III.

Essay 2 – Operational excellence and long-term value creation: A stock market
perspective on the productivity dilemma

Abstract
Operational excellence is sometimes viewed as inherently incompatible with long-term
value creation. The productivity dilemma literature, in particular, views operational excellence
unfavorably; firms with a pronounced emphasis on operational excellence are said to be too
short-term oriented and at risk of trading long-term viability for short-term profitability.
Empirical evidence from the operations and finance literatures, however, suggests that
operational excellence may facilitate internal cash-flow generation – which, in turn, is an
effective financing instrument for firm growth and long-term value creation. In light of these
contrasting views and findings, this research revisits the relationship between operational
excellence and long-term value creation. Adopting a stock market perspective and drawing on
signaling theory, I argue that stock market participants will view operational excellence as a
positive signal for value creation in the long term. In light of propositions from the productivity
dilemma literature, I hypothesize that this effect is contingent on two factors: the stock market’s
expectation of firm short-term revenue growth and the firm’s research and development efforts.
Short-term revenue growth expectations are suggested to have a dampening effect on the stock
market’s anticipation of long-term value, whereas firm R&D efforts are expected to strengthen
the market’s positive outlook. The empirical analysis is based on a panel data set of 864 publicly
traded US manufacturing firms over the 2010-2015 period, and the results provide support for
the hypothesized relationships. Implications for research and practice are discussed.
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Introduction
Process management practices such as Just-In-Time and Total Quality Management are
usually leveraged to streamline day-to-day operations for consistency and process reliability
(Ding, 2015). When properly implemented, they facilitate the achievement of operational
excellence (Kaplan and Norton, 2008) – i.e., a core competency reflecting a firm’s ability to
efficiently, effectively, and profitably run its day-to-day operations (Treacy and Wiersema,
1993). Operational excellence is in that sense a short-term performance benefit of properly
implemented process management practices and a potent enabler of firm competitive advantage
(Kaplan and Norton, 2008; Treacy and Wiersema, 1993).
It has been suggested, however, that the benefits of process management practices can be
ephemeral and at odds with strategic flexibility and long-term value creation (Adler et al., 2009).
The productivity dilemma literature, in particular, suggests that firms with a pronounced
emphasis on process management are at risk of growing too entrenched in a narrowly defined
modus operandi and, thus, become vulnerable to changing market conditions (Benner and
Tushman, 2003). Proponents of this line of thought portray process management practices as a
double-edged sword with opposing short- and long-term effects on firm performance. As much
as they praise the practices for enabling the “consistent execution” (Adler et al., 2009, p.99) of
firm strategy in the short term, they warn that the practices “can also hinder learning and
innovation, leaving organizations rigid and inflexible” in the long term (Adler et al., 2009, p.99).
In a sense, the productivity dilemma literature suggests that there is a tradeoff between shortterm operational excellence and long-term value creation (Adler et al., 2009; Benner and
Tushman, 2003).
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Although compelling in many ways, the productivity dilemma argument stands in stark
contrast with abounding anecdotal evidence of organizations successfully leveraging process
management practices to propel themselves to the forefront of their respective industries.
Companies such as Toyota and Walmart explicitly attribute most of their long-standing success
to their ability to achieve operational excellence through the proper implementation of superior
process management practices. Toyota’s continuous-improvement philosophy has earned the
company the title of world’s greatest manufacturer many times over (Liker and Franz, 2011), and
Walmart’s superior logistics and process management practices have enabled the company to
dominate the retail industry for decades (Miller, 2014). Indeed, in an interview with CNBC,
Walmart CEO Doug McMillon said that process-management-driven operational excellence
spurs productivity in the short term and provides necessary cash to finance expansion plans and
enable long-term shareholder value creation (CNBC, 2015).
In line with these anecdotal observations, empirical evidence from the finance and
operations management literatures appears to collectively indicate that the proper
implementation of process management practices may, in fact, facilitate rather than obstruct firm
growth and long-term value creation. Research in operations management has linked process
management practices to firm cash-flow generation (Fullerton et al., 2003), and the finance
literature has shown internal cash-flow generation to serve as the primary financing instrument
for firm expansion plans and long-term growth (Myers, 1984; Strebulaev and Yang, 2013). All in
all, these anecdotal and empirical observations invite the conjecture that properly implemented
process management practices may be an effective instrument for firm long-term value creation
(LTVC).
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This research assesses the validity of that conjecture by investigating the extent to which
a firm’s successful implementation of process management practices, as reflected in the firm’s
achieved operational excellence, signals long-term value creation as anticipated by the stock
market. Value is herein construed from the shareholder’s perspective in accordance with the
view that shareholder value maximization is the most encompassing indicator of long-term value
creation (Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004); maximizing shareholder value is said to “implicitly
provide a mechanism to reach a proper balance between the conflicting objectives of the various
stakeholders of a firm” (Klibi et al., 2010, p.286). Firm market value is, therefore, used as an
indicator of long-term shareholder value creation (e.g., Lavie et al., 2011).
Drawing on signaling theory (Spence, 1973), I argue that the investment community will
– contrary to the productivity dilemma narrative – view operational excellence as a positive
signal for long-term shareholder value creation. This positive assessment is, however,
hypothesized to be contextual and contingent on two market- and firm-level factors: (1) the stock
market’s expectation of firm short-term revenue growth and (2) the firm’s R&D efforts. Firm
short-term revenue growth expectations are suggested to have a dampening effect on the stock
market’s assessment of the long-term value creation potential of operational excellence, whereas
firm R&D efforts are hypothesized to strengthen the stock market’s positive outlook.
This research departs from and augments the extant literature in two major ways (cf.
Figure 1). First, it focuses on achieved operational excellence as the antecedent of interest
driving long-term value creation. Most of the existing literature links process management
practices such as Total Quality Management (e.g., Powell, 1995), Just-In-Time (e.g., Fullerton et
al., 2003), and Six Sigma (e.g., Shafer and Moeller, 2012) to long-term value creation without
controlling for the effectiveness with which such practices are implemented. While those studies
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contribute valuable insights and advance our understanding of the strategic value of process
management, they leave room for implementation-related confounds. Two firms implementing
the same process management practices may not necessarily achieve the same level of
operational excellence due to possible differences in implementation effectiveness. Studies that
do not account for such differences de facto assume that process management practices
invariably and uniformly lead to operational excellence across firms and contexts irrespective of
how effectively (or not) the practices are implemented. By measuring achieved operational
excellence (instead of assuming it) and using it as the antecedent of interest, this research
effectively eliminates the risk of implementation-related confounds and isolates the effect of
properly implemented process management practices on the stock market’s assessment of LTVC.

Figure 1 – Extant literature vs. this research

The second way this research departs from and augments the extant literature is by
relying on the stock market’s ex-ante assessment of long-term value creation. This is again
motivated by a concern about confounding effects. Previous studies have mostly measured longterm value creation using ex-post assessments (Hendricks and Singhal, 2001a; Modi and Mishra,
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2011; Benner and Tushman, 2002). The most common ex-post assessment consists in measuring
performance outcomes three to five years after some process management practices are
implemented (e.g., Powell, 1995; Douglas and Judge, 2001; Shah and Ward, 2003). While these
assessments can be practically appealing, the substantial temporal separation between the trigger
event (e.g., implementation of process management practices) and the presumed long-term
outcome (e.g., value creation) makes it difficult to unambiguously establish causality. A
multitude of events, both exogenous and endogenous (e.g., new competitive landscape, change
of management), could occur at any time during the three to five year window separating the
observation of the trigger and the measurement of the outcome. Such unaccounted-for events
could have material effects on the presumed outcome, thus confounding the relationship of
interest. To work around this risk of confounding events, I use the stock market’s ex-ante
assessment of firm future cash flows into infinity as a means to measure anticipated LTVC (e.g.,
Hillman and Keim, 2001). This approach, premised on the efficient markets hypothesis that
views markets as collectively efficient and effective in evaluating the cash-flow generation
potential of public firms (Fama, 1998), has been shown to reasonably approximate ex-post
realizations (e.g., Kale et al., 2012).
This research contributes to theory and practice in several ways. First, it advances our
understanding of the strategic value of properly implemented process management practices by
examining the LTVC potential of operational excellence. Second, it helps top managers reduce
the risk of suboptimal strategy formulation by providing boundary conditions to the long-term
benefits of operational excellence in the form of two contingency factors – firm short-term
revenue growth prospects and firm R&D efforts. Third, it provides a rationale as to why many
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top executives continue to aggressively pursue process management and associated operational
excellence despite numerous warnings from the productivity dilemma literature.
Background and hypotheses
Despite a strong indictment from the conceptual productivity dilemma literature,
empirical research addressing the long-term value creation potential of process management
practices and associated operational excellence remains surprisingly sparse. While numerous
studies have addressed and documented the practices’ various short-term benefits (e.g., Anand et
al., 2010; Tatikonda et al., 2013), few have examined the corresponding long-term effects –
achieved, perceived, or anticipated. With a relative emphasis on the impact of practices such as
Total Quality Management (TQM) and Just-In-Time (JIT), empirical findings are relatively
dated and remain collectively inconclusive. Using self-reported perceptual measures of firm
performance, Powell (1995) and Samson and Terziovski (1999) found no evidence that TQM
helps create value three years post implementation. In contrast, Douglas and Judge (2001) found
evidence of a strong positive relationship over the same timeframe using the same perceptual
measures. Similar conflicting findings are also reported by studies using objective measures of
LTVC. Whereas Easton and Jarrell (1998) claim strong positive value-creation effects three to
five years post implementation, Staw and Epstein (2000) find no such evidence.
A potential reason for the inconsistent results in prior research could be that the
performance benefits of process management practice were studied without ascertaining
implementation effectiveness (York and Miree, 2004). To remedy this possible weakness,
Hendricks and Singhal (2001b) focused on firms that have been recognized – through quality
awards – for their effective implementation of process management practices. Investigating longterm market-based performance outcomes, Hendricks and Singhal (2001b) show award winners
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to significantly outperform non-winners on the stock market up to five years post recognition.
However, York and Miree (2004) expressed concern over the adequacy of using quality awards
as a proxy for implementation effectiveness, arguing that different quality awards have different
“criteria, standards, and levels of competition” (p. 294) and may not be consistent means of
ascertaining implementation effectiveness.
In light of the literature’s conflicting findings and the concern raised by York and Miree
(2004), this research revisits the relationship between properly implemented process
management practices and long-term value creation. Achieved operational excellence is used as
an objective indicator of proper implementation and is linked to LTVC as anticipated by the
stock market. By focusing on achieved operational excellence as the antecedent of interest, this
research aims to establish a confound-free link between the proper implementation of process
management practices and LTVC.
Drawing on signaling theory (Spence, 1973), this research is premised on the idea that
operational excellence information embedded in a firm’s financial statements and accompanying
notes will act as an objective signal that the investment community can use to make inferences
about the firm’s LTVC prospects. Despite their focus on past realizations, financial statements
are widely referred to by market participants as signal-carrying media from which insights into
the strategic orientation and LTVC potential of corporations can be gleaned (Ou and Penman,
1989). It is expected that the stock market will, in accordance with the efficient markets
hypothesis2, adjust its assessment of firm LTVC prospects as new operational excellence signals
become available.

2

The efficient market hypothesis stipulates that stock market participants are collectively
efficient at gathering, sorting, interpreting, and assimilating large amounts of investment-value
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Signaling theory
Introduced by Michael Spence (1973), signaling theory suggests that markets are often
characterized by incomplete and asymmetrically located information. In most transactions, one
party – the insider – may privately hold pertinent information without which the other party – the
outsider – may inadequately assess the underlying value of the object of the transaction
(Connelly et al., 2011). Two types of information are of particular interest in this case:
information about quality and information about intent (Stiglitz, 2000). The first pertains to
characteristics of the object of the transaction whereas the second relates to the behavior and
behavioral intentions of the insider (Connelly et al., 2011). An outsider that lacks full knowledge
of either quality or intent is expected to seek observable and alterable characteristics that
reasonably qualify the object of the transaction and give an indication of the insider’s intent
(Bergh and Gibbons, 2010; Certo, 2003). Such characteristics are called signals (Spence, 2002)
and are meant to reduce the outsider’s informational disadvantage and increase the accuracy of
his/her assessment of the transaction at hand.
According to signaling theory (Spence, 1973), signals have to meet two conditions to be
effective. First, they must be sufficiently costly to the signaler (Bergh and Gibbons, 2010) such
that they can neither be obtained without merit nor be fabricated without a prohibitively high
opportunity cost to the signaler (Connelly et al., 2011). Second, they must be deemed by the
receiver – i.e., the outsider – as having high information value about quality and intent (Bergh
and Gibbons, 2010). The information content of financial statements meets both conditions.
First, the format, content, and reporting requirements of financial statements are regulated by the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and strictly monitored by the Securities and
information (Womack, 1996) to effectively assess the long-term value creation potential of
public equities (Fama, 1998).
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Exchange Commission (SEC) with the clear purpose to make reported financial information as
reflective of the true financial health and performance of corporations as possible (Beaver et al.,
2005). The institution of internal audit committees and the requirement that financial statements
of public corporations be reviewed and validated by independent external auditors are just two
measures, among many, that make signaling through financial statements costly to corporate
managers and difficult to fabricate (Xie et al., 2003). Second, financial statements are widely
perceived by market participants as a valuable source of information on the underlying quality
and value creation potential of public corporations (Ou and Penman, 1989; Frankel and Li,
2004).
Operational excellence and long-term value creation
Operational excellence signals a firm’s ability to efficiently, effectively, and profitably3
fulfill its competitive strategy (Adam and Samidass, 1989; Treacy and Wiersema, 1993). A
short-term performance outcome of the proper implementation of process management practices
(Treacy and Wiersema, 1993), operational excellence is often viewed as a strong indicator of
superior executional capabilities (Kaplan and Norton, 2008).
The ability to properly execute firm strategy is as a major source of competitive
advantage (Kaplan and Norton, 2008) and a substantial facilitator of shareholder value creation.
Porter (1979) observes that superior executional capabilities enable above-average returns and
create superior shareholder value. Knott (2003) offers empirical evidence corroborating Porter’s

3

Efficiency refers to a firm’s ability to generate more output per unit of input or use less input
per unit of output, relative to peers; the greater the output to input ratio, the more efficient the
firm is (Priem and Butler, 2001). Effectiveness reflects the ability of a firm to use scarce
resources to fulfill its market promise (Heikkila, 2002). On-time delivery and order fulfillment
accuracy are examples of indicators of operational effectiveness. Operating profitability indicates
a firm’s ability to capture value from sales proceeds after accounting for the cost of operating
inputs and transformational resources (Bowman and Ambrosini, 2000).
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observation; she shows that franchised establishments – known for their routinized processes and
superior executional capabilities – generate 50% higher total returns than independently run
peers (Knott, 2003).
Operational excellence is also positively associated with revenue generation (Reed et al.,
1996). Firms with proven records of operational excellence signal dependability and invite
stronger business ties with potential partners (Shin et al., 2000). In an environment where supply
chain disruptions can be extremely costly (Hendricks and Singhal, 2003), firms with a proven
ability to provide a reliable source of supply are in high demand (Wang et al., 2010). Such firms
reduce client exposure to supply uncertainty and offer transaction-cost advantages over the
competition (Williamson, 1981). As such, they are likely to enjoy stronger and longer-lasting
business ties that are conducive to more stable and sustainable revenue streams (Kalwani and
Narayandas, 1995). Operational excellence is, therefore, expected to be viewed as a signal for
LTVC through enhanced revenue generation.
The positive impact on revenue generation, coupled with a well-documented effect on
cost containment and waste elimination (e.g., Browning and Heath, 2009), makes operational
excellence an effective free-cash-flow generation instrument and an ideal enabler of firm growth
and LTVC. Short-term cash flow generation has been identified as the most effective facilitator
of long-term expansion plans. Myers’ (1984) seminal study on the capital structure of
corporations found that 62% of all capital expenditures of non-financial US corporations from
1973 to 1982 were financed with internally generated cash. The study’s finding – more recently
confirmed in a study over the period 1962-2009 (Strebulaev and Yang, 2013) – implies that
operational excellence can be a potent enabler of LTVC through short-term cash-flow
generation.
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Lastly, operational excellence is a versatile competency that can be leveraged to initiate
forays into new markets (Markman et al., 2009). Many routinized processes lend themselves to
be implemented across markets and industries, enabling companies to achieve economies of
scope and LTVC (Wernerfelt, 1984). For example, Amazon’s operational excellence has enabled
the company to break down industry barriers in unprecedented ways. Starting as an online
bookstore, the company leveraged the versatility of its operational routines and processes to
expand into an extensive list of new product categories and create above-average long-term
shareholder value as a result.
H1: Achieved operational excellence will be positively associated with anticipated longterm value creation.
The moderating effect of short-term revenue growth expectations
A central element in the productivity dilemma literature is its focus on growth
opportunities as the upside potential at risk of being sacrificed in the pursuit of operational
excellence (Benner and Tushman, 2003). Growth is, in fact, portrayed as an opportunity cost in a
sense that firms that are heavily focused on achieving operational excellence may fail to take
advantage of available growth opportunities. Such firms are said to be process-managementdriven and focused on perfecting their current modus operandi in a rather inward-looking fashion
(Adler et al., 2009). As such, they are criticized for being at risk of growing so focused on
process mapping, improvement, and control that they become too rigid to recognize, let alone
seize growth opportunities as and when they arise (Benner and Tushman, 2003). Assuming that
is true, one could then contend that firms with different growth prospects will have different
growth-related opportunity costs and, thus, different long-term downsides to operational
excellence – with the ones with the greatest growth opportunities suffering the highest
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opportunity cost. Accordingly, stock market participants are likely to interpret a firm’s
operational excellence signal differently depending on their expectations of the firm’s short-term
revenue growth.
When growth expectations are high, the stock market will be less eager to reward
operational excellence than it would revenue growth. Operational excellence may, in fact, be
viewed as a hindrance to growth. A firm that scores high on operational excellence may be
viewed as favoring margin preservation over market share gains, and forgoing growth
opportunities in the process. In the same vein, operational excellence could be viewed as a
reflection of excessively lean operations (Eroglu and Hofer, 2011) that may translate into lost
sales in the immediate term, with negative long-term ripple effects on customer loyalty and
future revenue generation (Moussaoui et al., 2016). Conversely, low operational excellence
under conditions of high revenue growth expectations may be tolerated on the premise that a lack
of short-term efficiency and operating profitability can be justified by the firm’s pursuit of
growth opportunities and long-term value creation.
H2: Stock market expectations of short-term firm revenue growth will negatively
moderate the relationship between achieved operational excellence and anticipated longterm value creation.
The moderating effect of firm R&D efforts
The productivity dilemma argument suggests that firms pursuing operational excellence
may achieve efficiency, effectiveness, and operating profitability in the short term, but may also
grow too rigid to adapt to changing market conditions in the long term (Adler et al., 2009).
Efforts meant to enhance operational excellence are said to induce routinization dynamics that
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cause firms to overcommit to modi operandi that gradually lose relevance as markets evolve
(Benner and Tushman, 2003; Wagner et al., 2012).
Firms that engage in R&D efforts are better positioned to mitigate that risk of rigidity and
gradual obsolescence. R&D efforts are means of experimentation that ensure a steady flow of
new ideas into the organization (March, 1991). Research on organizational change and
adaptation suggests that R&D efforts enable organizations to enrich their knowledge pool and
stay current on relevant market developments (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Zahra and George,
2002) with a positive impact on strategic adaptability (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2010).
From a signaling perspective, firms that engage in R&D efforts while achieving high
operational excellence show ambidextrous capabilities likely to be perceived by the stock market
as positive signals for long-term value creation. Stock-market participants are fully aware of the
dual exploitation-exploration mandate of organizations (Lavie et al., 2011; Stein, 1989). They are
particularly attentive and responsive to signals of firm exploration (or lack thereof). Woolridge
and Snow (1990) show a strong positive relationship between a firm’s strategic R&D efforts and
its stock market valuation. Similarly, Stein (1989) shows the stock market to be efficient in
detecting signals of an overemphasis on short-term outcomes – such as operational excellence –
at the expense of exploratory efforts – such as R&D – meant to enhance the odds of sustained
long-term value creation. Firms that achieve short-term profitability by cutting discretionary
R&D expenditures are viewed by market participants as jeopardizing long-term value creation
and are penalized accordingly (Gentry and Shen, 2013; Stein, 1990). Conversely, firms that
engage in exploration through R&D efforts while showing a strong ability to run their day-to-day
operations efficiently, effectively, and profitably are viewed as ambidextrous and more
conducive to long-term value creation.
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H3: Firm R&D efforts will positively moderate the relationship between achieved
operational excellence and anticipated long-term value creation.
Data and measurement
To test the proposed hypotheses, a panel data set was compiled following the procedure
outlined in Figure 2. The initial sample consisted of all publicly traded manufacturing firms (i.e.,
NAICS codes 31-33) listed on the NYSE, NYSE MKT (formerly AMEX), or NASDAQ
exchanges between 2010 and 2015. This time period corresponds to the most recent window that
is long-enough for the purpose of this study and void of major exogenous shocks (e.g., the 2008
financial crisis) that could otherwise influence the relationships under investigation. From an
initial sample of 2,353 firms and 11,707 firm-year observations, I proceeded to exclude firms
with particularly high R&D expenditures, low market capitalizations and limited analyst
coverage: the rationale behind the exclusion of firms with R&D expenditures greater than sales is
that firms with such a high R&D intensity tend to be research firms with limited manufacturing
operations (e.g., Gentry and Shen, 2013). Firms with market capitalizations of less than $300
million (often referred to as micro and nano caps) or average annual sales of less than $10
million were removed from consideration since such small firms are often subject to infrequent
and/or speculative trading that distorts their market values (e.g., Kim and Bettis, 2014). Lastly, I
excluded firms that are followed by fewer than five analysts, as is common in similar studies
(e.g., Loh and Mian, 2006; Mikhail et al., 1999). Greater analyst coverage ensures investor
scrutiny and strengthens signal-based assessment models as it facilitates the faster dissemination
and assimilation of firm financial signals (Hong et al., 2000). After this screening procedure and
the exclusion of observations with missing data, the final sample consists of an unbalanced panel
of 864 firms with a total 3,128 firm-year observations. Figure 3 provides the breakdown of
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sampled firms by industry at the 3-digit NAICS code level. Although the sample spans a wide
range of manufacturing industries, it remains dominated by four industries collectively
representing two thirds of sampled firms.
Figure 2 – Sampling procedure
Manufacturing firms (NAICS 31-33)
Listed on NYSE, AMEX, or
R&D-to-sales ratio ≤ 1
Market Cap ≥ $300M & Revenue ≥
Analyst coverage ≥ 5 analysts

Final sample = 864 firms and 3,128 firm-year observations

Figure 3 – Number of sampled firms by industry
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Three data sources were used to construct the measures for the dependent, independent
and control variables. First, the COMPUSTAT database was used to collect firm accounting
data. Second, the CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices) database was used to collect
firm historical stock prices and dividend distributions, as well as market index levels. Third, the
I/B/E/S (Institutional Brokers' Estimate System) database was used to collect analyst estimates of
future firm revenues.
Dependent variable
A firm’s long-term value creation potential has been measured in a variety of ways in the
extant literature. Although researchers have used both objective and subjective measures, the
latter are more commonly employed in research studying privately held companies and
individual business units of larger conglomerates (e.g., Dess and Robinson, 1984; Fang et al.,
2007). Objective measures of long-term value creation are mostly market-based (e.g., Hillman
and Keim, 2001; Uotila et al., 2009). The tendency to use the stock market as a gauge for the
long-term value creation potential of organizations is premised on the efficient market
hypothesis, which stipulates that the stock market efficiently evaluates future cash flows of
organizations and appropriately prices them in the long run (Fama, 1998). Most market-based
measures are, therefore, forward-looking and capture the long-term value creation potential of
organizations.
In this study, I use the price-to-sales (P2S) ratio to assess a firm’s long-term value
creation potential. This valuation metric is popular in research and industry as a measure of the
stock market’s expectation of a firm’s long-term value creation potential (e.g., Brunnermeier and
Nagel, 2004). P2S expresses a firm’s market capitalization as a multiple of the firm’s most recent
annual sales. It reflects the stock market’s anticipation of the firm’s ability to convert sales
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proceeds into positive cash flows into perpetuity. The P2S ratio is preferred over other popular
financial multiples for the purposes of this study because it assumes business continuity and
accommodates the assessment of firms with negative earnings, unlike price-to-book and price-toearnings respectively (e.g., Brunnermeir and Nagel, 2004; Purnanandam and Swaminathan,
2004). The price-to-sales ratio (P2S) for firm i is measured over the firm’s first fiscal quarter of
fiscal year t+1 as follows:
P2S.%|01234 =

MktCap.%|01234
Sales012

where MktCap.%|01234 is firm i’s average market capitalization during the first quarter following
the firm’s most recent fiscal-year end (i.e., Q1|FY9% ), and Sales012 is firm i’s annual sales in
the most recent closed fiscal year (FYt). MktCap.%|01234 is in turn measured as follows:
C

MktCap.%|01234 = ;
<

p< ∗ SharesOutstanding <
n

where pij is firm i’s closing stock price on trading day j of Q1|FYt+1, SharesOutstandingij is the
number of firm i shares outstanding in trading day j, and n is the total number of days firm i
traded during Q1|FY9%. Sales figures were retrieved from the COMPUSTAT database. Stock
prices and daily numbers of shares outstanding were obtained from the CRSP database.
P2S ratios are measured using the firm’s average market capitalization over Q1|FY+1
instead of the entire year following the most recent fiscal year-end in order to eliminate the
confounding effects of subsequent quarterly earnings announcements on the market’s assessment
of the firm’s long term value creation potential. As prior research has shown, markets adjust their
assessment of long-term value as new material information, such as that contained in earnings
announcements, becomes available (Beaver, 1968).
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A myriad of alternative market-based measures of long-term value creation have been
used in prior research. The most common ones include Tobin’s Q and excess returns. While both
present benefits, they suffer shortcomings that make unsuitable for the current study. Tobin’s Q
(Brainard and Tobin, 1968) is the ratio of outstanding financial claims on an organization over
the current replacement costs of the organization’s assets. A major downside to Tobin’s Q is that
its denominator is difficult to estimate. Not only is it challenging to assess the value of intangible
assets (Hillman and Keim, 2001), it is also extremely difficult to accurately evaluate the current
replacement costs of assets (Lewellen and Badrinath, 1997). Most of the literature uses a
workaround approach to estimate the ratio’s denominator by using firm book value as a proxy
(e.g., Richard et al., 2007), but this approach has been deemed inadequate in prior research
(Lewellen and Bardinath (1997).
Excess returns, on the other hand, measure the marginal return of a company’s stock
above and beyond what is expected of companies with similar levels of volatility (e.g.,
McDonald et al., 2008). This measure is inherently backward-looking as it captures a stock’s
performance over a given period in the past. It is also ambiguous as to whether such past
performance can be indicative of future performance (Grinblatt and Moskowitz, 2004). In
addition, excess returns are often used as a proxy for a firm’s short-term rather than long-term
value creation (e.g., Li and Tallman, 2011).
Independent variables
Operational excellence is inherently multidimensional and context-specific. Different
measures have been used in the OM literature to assess different aspects of operational
excellence. From inventory levels and order variability (Tsay and Lovejoy, 1999) to capacity
allocation (Cachon and Lariviere, 1999) and order cycle time (Hult, Ketchen, and Slater, 2004),
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the measures abound and vary by context and research question. In an attempt to create an
integrative multidimensional measure that captures the essence of operational excellence in the
manufacturing context, Bharadwaj et al. (2007) developed an index score combining three
objective metrics of operational performance – i.e., inventory turns, on-time (backlog) ratio, and
gross margin. The measure is appropriate for the current study because it captures the three key
dimensions of operational excellence as conceptualized in this study – i.e., efficiency,
effectiveness, and operating profitability. It is also appropriate because it was developed
specifically for the manufacturing context, which is the focus of this study. In order to minimize
the number of instances of undefined ratios because of a zero denominator (e.g., inventory turns
for a company that reports no inventory), an adapted version of Bharadwaj et al.’s (2007)
measure is used. Instead of inventory turns, I use inventory-to-sales ratio; and instead of on-time
ratio, I use backlog ratio calculated as the ratio of backlogs to the sum of backlogs and sales per
fiscal year. I also use (1-gross margin) instead of gross margin in order to scale all three
dimensions in the same direction. Since the three metrics have disparate scales, I converted them
into t-scores at the 3-digit-NAICS-code level for each year of the sampling period. This
transformation puts all three components of the Operational Excellence variable on equal footing
and effectively ensures that no one component dominates the overall index score. It also enables
the adjustment for inter-industry differences by evaluating firms within their respective 3-digitNAICS codes (e.g., York and Miree, 2004). The final index score is then constructed as the sum
of the three metrics multiplied by -1 such that higher scores represent greater operational
excellence. All three metrics are constructed from data available in the COMPUSTAT database.
Firm Short-Term Growth Expectation is measured as the ratio of the equity analyst
consensus estimate of firm revenues for fiscal year t over the firm’s actual revenues in fiscal year
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t-1. Consensus estimates are calculated as the simple average of estimates issued by all analysts
following the firm during the last month of the firm’s fiscal year (Bowers et al., 2014). Prior
research recommends using consensus estimates from the last fiscal month for their richer
information content (McNichols, 1989) and increased accuracy (Kasznik and Lev, 1995).
Analyst estimates are retrieved from the I/B/E/S database.
Firm R&D Efforts is operationalized using an industry-adjusted version of the customary R&D
intensity measure – i.e., the ratio of firm research and development expenditures to firm total
sales in fiscal year t (e.g., Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1989). The ratio reflects the extent to which
a firm reinvests sales proceeds into exploratory initiatives meant to improve the firm’s long-term
value creation prospects. Because R&D expenditures can vary significantly across industries, it
is important to control for unobserved industry effects. As such, each firm-year R&D intensity
measure is converted into a t-score at the 3-digit NAICS code level for each year of the sampling
period, in the same way I converted the three components of the operational excellence measure.
R&D expenditures and sales data were retrieved from the COMPUSTAT database.
Control variables
Three firm and market factors known to influence firm market capitalization are used as
control variables in this study. First, I control for revenue surprise – i.e., the extent to which a
firm’s revenue for the fiscal year differs from the most recent equity analyst consensus estimate.
Analyst estimates are a major determining factor in the valuation of public equities (Bowers et
al., 2014). They represent a vital source of information about the probable financial condition of
public corporations ahead of quarterly earnings announcements (Gleason and Lee, 2003). As
such, they are closely watched by the investment community and serve as a guidepost in the
price discovery process (Kasznik and McNichols, 2002). Firms that meet or exceed expectations
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tend to see a positive market reaction in the form of stock price appreciation, whereas firms that
miss expectations tend to experience a drop in the value of their stock (Kasznick and McNichols,
2002). In this study, I control for Revenue Surprise – i.e., the difference between actual revenues
and the consensus revenue estimate (Alan et al., 2014).
Second, I control for dividend yield in the first quarter following the current fiscal year.
Firm long-term value (as reflected in its stock price) is often calculated as the net present value
of future cash flows (Brealey et al., 2012). When a firm distributes a dividend, it reduces the
amount of future cash flows by an equivalent amount. As such, equity prices should adjust down
any time a dividend is accrued, and they should do so by the amount of the dividend (Bali and
Hite, 1998). Dividend Yield is calculated as the ratio of quarterly ordinary dividends to the
firm’s average market capitalization in the first quarter of fiscal year t+1 (i.e., Q1|FY9%).
Third, I control for the overall stock market performance. Asset pricing models such as
the CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model) suggest that individual stock prices are driven by
idiosyncratic firm characteristics as well as overall market conditions and returns (e.g., Lintner,
1965). Overall market returns are measured as the rate of return of the S&P 500 index
contemporaneous to Q1|FY9% – i.e., the quarter when the dependent variable is measured for
each firm i. For clarity, the timeline of measurement of the dependent, independent, and control
variables is summarized in Figure 4. Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations are provided
in Table 1.
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Figure 4 – Variable measurement timeline
FYt
Q1

Q2

FYt+1
Q3

Q4

Q1
Time

Operational Excellence

LT Value
Creation

Rev. Growth Expectations

Rev.
Surprise

R&D Efforts

Div. Yield
Mkt Return
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Table 1 - Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations
Variable/construct
Obs.
Mean
s.d.
1
2
3
4
5
1 . Price-to-Sales Ratio
3128
2.693 3.753
2 . Revenue Surprise
3128
0.002 0.030 0.137 *
3 . Dividend Yield
3128
0.003 0.008 -0.093 * -0.014
4 . Market Return
3128
1.127 0.059 0.091 * -0.014 -0.023
5 . Operational Excellence
3128
2.142 4.884 0.161 * 0.043 * 0.016 -0.137 *
6 . Short-term Revenue Growth Expectations
3128
1.256 3.426 0.063 * 0.074 * -0.021 -0.007
0.052 *
7 . R&D Efforts
3128 -0.411 12.523 0.342 * 0.066 * -0.051 * 0.000
-0.046 *
* Significant at the 0.05 level

6

0.064 *
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Model specification and estimation
As mentioned earlier, the dataset used in this study consists of an unbalanced panel of
864 firms and 3,128 firm-year observations over the period 2010-2015. As such, I first test for
the presence of panel effects: a Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (BPLM) test indicates that
the variance across panel units is not zero, providing evidence for the presence of panel effects
(χ2 = 853; p-value<0.001). The Wooldridge’s Lagrange Multiplier test, in turn, provides
evidence for first-order autocorrelation of residuals (F-statistic = 4.08; p-value=0.04), prompting
us to model errors as an AR(1) process.
Besides panel effects, I also recognize the concern of omitted variable bias. Many
unmeasured phenomena could potentially have an effect on the dependent variable. Such omitted
variables are problematic as they cause estimates to be biased. When that is the case, using a
fixed-effects (FE) model corrects for the bias by adding unit-level dummy variables. While the
FE method can be effective in producing unbiased estimates, it is substantially less efficient than
random-effects (RE) modeling. It is common practice for scholars to run a Hausman test to
assess whether an FE or an RE model is superior for the dataset at hand. Despite the ubiquity of
this practice, however, many scholars have spoken against its adequacy (e.g., Bell and Jones,
2015). In fact, some said that “it is ‘neither necessary nor sufficient’ (Clark and Linzer 2012, 2)
to use the Hausman test as the sole basis of a researcher’s ultimate methodological decision”
(Bell and Jones, 2015, p.139). The decision should depend on contextual and theoretical
considerations that go beyond the Hausman test, as long as the covariates used in the model are
not correlated with the residuals of the RE model (Kennedy, 2003). As such, the ultimate test for
whether or not RE modeling is appropriate is to run pairwise correlations between the RE
model’s residuals and the model’s covariates. Doing so for the current study’s dataset reveals
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that only one variable is correlated (r = - 0.079; p-value<0.001) with the residuals. As such, there
is no strong statistical basis for preferring an FE over an RE model for the dataset at hand; even
more so that there is a strong theoretical and contextual rationale for using an RE model. RE
models are used to explain long-run effects while FE models are used to explain short-run effects
(Kennedy, 2003). Given the long-run nature of the relationships under investigation in this study,
an RE model is deemed appropriate. Therefore, the following random-effects model with AR(1)
disturbances is estimated using the xtregar procedure in STATA:
P2S.%|01234 = μ + α% RevenueSurprise012 + α& DividendYield.%|01234
+ α' S&P500RateOfReturn.%|01234 + α( OpEx01I
+ α) RevGrowthExpectations012 + αK R&D2Sales012
+ αL OpEx ∗ RevGrowthExpectations012 + αM OpEx ∗ R&D2Sales012

+ (μO

+ ε01234 )
where μ is the overall intercept term and (μ + ε01234 ) is a composite error term comprising a
random intercept component (μ ) measuring the extent to which firm i’s intercept differs from
the overall intercept μ, and a within-firm disturbance component (ε01234 ) reflecting the random
deviation of firm i form the sample average in period t+1. ε01234 is modeled as an AR(1) process
due to the presence of first-order autocorrelation.
In an effort to ascertain the validity and robustness of the above RE model, a betweeneffects (BE) model was also estimated. Between-effects models collapse time-series values of
the dependent and independent variables into single average values for each panel unit (i.e., each
firm in this study) and run a cross-sectional OLS regression on the transformed data (Kennedy,
2003). As such between-effects models ignore short-run, within-unit variances and exclusively
analyze cross-sectional (i.e., between) variance (Kennedy, 2003).
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Results
The empirical results are presented in Table 2. Panels A and B, respectively, show the
main-effect and full-model results of the autoregressive random-effects model. Panels C and D,
in turn, show the equivalent estimates of the between-effects model analyzed to assess the
robustness of the random-effects results.
Starting with panel A, all three controls have their expected signs – with two being
statistically significant. In line with expectations, firm revenue surprise is found to positively
influence the stock market’s assessment of long-term value creation (α1 = 4.028; p = 0.005). The
S&P 500 rate of return is also found to have a similarly positive effect (α3 = 3.672; p<0.001).
Dividend yield is not found to have a significant impact on the stock market’s anticipation of
firm long-term value creation. Regarding the main independent variable of interest, the positive
and statistically significant coefficient estimate of Operational Excellence (α4 = 0.035; p =
0.001) suggests that the stock market views operational excellence as a positive signal for firm
long-term value creation, thus providing support for Hypothesis 1.
In Panel B, interaction terms are added to assess how market- and firm-level
characteristics moderate the relationship between operational excellence and long-term value
creation. Hypothesis 2 proposes that the stock market will view operational excellence less
positively the more optimistic it is about a firm’s short-term revenue growth prospects. The
estimation results provide support for this hypothesis, as evidenced by the negative and
statistically significant coefficient estimate of the interaction term between operational
excellence and short-term revenue growth expectations (α7 = – 0.006; p = 0.008). This finding is
of particular interest because it provides a boundary condition to the long-term value creation
potential of operational excellence.
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Table 2 – Estimation results; DV = Firm price-to-sales ratio
Random effects with AR(1) disturbances
Variables
A
B
Intercept
-1.327 **
-1.478 **
(0.666)
(0.677)
Control Variables
Revenue Surprise
4.028 ***
4.633 ***
(1.453)
(1.431)
Dividend Yield
-8.398
-8.700
(5.355)
(5.281)
Market Return
3.672 ***
3.752 ***
(0.577)
(0.587)
Independent Variables
Operational Excellence (OpEx)
0.035 ***
0.036 ***
(0.010)
(0.010)
Revenue Growth Expectations
0.022
0.067 ***
(0.017)
(0.024)
***
R&D Efforts
0.098
0.098 ***
(0.007)
(0.007)
Interactions
OpEx * Rev. Growth Expectations
-0.006 ***
(0.002)
OpEx * R&D Efforts
0.002 **
(0.001)
R2

0.151
2

0.163
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Wald χ
267.580 ***
291.910 ***
F-statistic
# of Observations
3128
3128
# of Firms
864
864
Standard errors between parentheses; *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01

Between effects
C
D
-27.244 ***
-27.751 ***
(5.077)
(5.006)
17.051 ***
(4.336)
-74.707 ***
(23.471)
26.511 ***
(4.495)

14.543 ***
(4.330)
-67.269 ***
(23.147)
26.932 ***
(4.432)

0.193 ***
(0.030)
-0.003
(0.021)
0.117 ***
(0.010)

0.185 ***
(0.030)
0.029
(0.031)
0.110 ***
(0.010)
-0.011 *
(0.006)
0.011 ***
(0.002)

0.146
45.590 ***
3128
864

0.164
39.000 ***
3128
864

The second moderating effect pertains to firm R&D efforts. Hypothesis 3 suggests that
firm R&D efforts will amplify the stock market’s positive assessment of operational excellence
as an effective instrument for long-term value creation. The estimation results provide support
for the hypothesis as shown by the positive and statistically (marginally) significant coefficient
estimate of the interaction term between operational excellence and firm R&D efforts (α8=0.002;
p=0.069). In line with the organizational ambidexterity literature, this finding indicates that
capital markets do indeed put a premium on organizations that balance exploitative and
exploratory initiatives.
The empirical results from panels C and D provide further support for the aforementioned
findings. As stated earlier, between-effects analyses were undertaken to ascertain the validity and
robustness of the random effects estimates. Such consistency of findings speaks to the robustness
of the empirical results to variations in estimation techniques.
Discussion and conclusion
This research explores the stock market’s ex-ante assessment of operational excellence as
a long-term value creation instrument in the manufacturing sector. The study’s findings provide
empirical evidence for a positive assessment; firms that demonstrate higher levels of operational
excellence are valued at a premium compared to peers. Based on the estimation results, the stock
market puts a 6.5% premium on firms that are one standard deviation above average on the
operational excellence scale, all else equal. This finding carries substantial economic
significance and reflects the stock market’s positive outlook on the operational achievement’s
long-term value creation potential. It also echoes a sentiment shared by a DuPont executive that
“operational excellence is one of the most important contributors to an organization’s sustainable
performance and growth” (Rains, 2014, p.1).
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The stock market does acknowledge, however, that the anticipated long-term benefits of
operational excellence are not of equal magnitude across contexts. In fact, it is shown that stock
market participants tend to reward operational excellence significantly less under conditions of
abundant growth opportunities. The more analysts expect a firm to grow its revenues in the short
term, the less favorably the stock market views its operational excellence as an instrument for
long-term value creation; and the lower a premium it puts on the operational achievement. This
finding indicates that operational excellence under conditions of abundant growth opportunities
is viewed as a sign of misaligned priorities whereby market share gains may be sacrificed in an
overzealous and counterproductive pursuit of short-term operational excellence. Conversely,
when markets are more mature and growth opportunities more scarce, the stock market tends to
reward operational excellence significantly more generously.
The third key finding of this research pertains to the amplifying effect of firm R&D
efforts on the stock market’s positive assessment of operational excellence as an instrument for
long-term value creation. One explanation of this finding is that market participants view firm
exploratory efforts as a hedging mechanism that helps mitigate the risk of competency traps
(Levitt and March, 1988). Firms that fail to engage in such efforts are viewed as myopic and at
risk of becoming overinvested in process management capabilities that may lose relevance in the
long term (e.g., capabilities related to the manufacturing of internal combustion engines in the
automotive industry). Firms that invest in R&D signal a willingness to experiment with new
ideas and may, hence, be viewed as less likely to suffer the negative effects of entrenched
routinization dynamics (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Such experimentation efforts enrich the
firm’s knowledge pool and enhance its adaptive capabilities (March, 1991), with a positive
impact on long-term value creation.

74

Taken together, the study’s findings indicate that the stock market views operational
excellence as inherently beneficial to firm long-term value creation. The results also indicate that
the market’s positive outlook is adjusted based on strategic fit and firm exploratory efforts. Firms
that aggressively pursue operational excellence under conditions of abundant growth
opportunities signal strategic misfit and misaligned priorities that force a counterproductive
tradeoff between operational excellence and firm revenue growth. Firms that fail to reinvest a
sufficient amount of the proceeds of operational excellence in exploratory efforts are viewed as
too short-term oriented, biased towards exploitation, and at risk of trading long-term viability for
short-term profitability.
This research contributes to theory and practice in several ways. First, it advances our
understanding of the strategic value of process management. By linking operational excellence to
long-term value creation, this research provides evidence that process management practices are
not necessarily myopic and counter-productive in the long run. It also indicates that the warnings
voiced within the productivity dilemma literature may not be warranted as is, and should perhaps
be redirected towards the improper implementation of process management practices instead of
suggesting that the practices are intrinsically at odds with long-term value creation. Second, this
research provides guidance for top managers as to the conditions under which the long-term
value creation potential of (properly implemented) process management practices may be
enhanced or dampened. As it stands, the extant literature is too coarse-grained and could induce
suboptimal decision making and resource misallocation. Managers subscribing to the
productivity dilemma narrative may unduly discount the long-term benefits of operational
excellence and underinvest in process management as a result, while those subscribing to a
contrary narrative may overcommit to process management practices beyond what relevant
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contingencies call for. This research provides the stock market’s perspective on two major
contingencies – firm short-term revenue growth prospects and firm R&D efforts – as a guidepost
to help reduce the risk of suboptimal strategy formulations. Third, and in light of prior research
showing the stock market’s influence on top management teams and firm conduct (e.g., Gentry
and Shen, 2013; Puffer and Weintrop, 1991), this research may provide a rationale as to why
many top executives continue to emphasize process management practices and associated
operational excellence as key enablers of sustained competitive advantage despite numerous
warnings from the productivity dilemma literature.
We hope that this research will stimulate further investigation of the strategic value of
operational excellence in particular and operations management in general. While the study
presents evidence of moderating effects of the stock market’s expectations of firm short-term
revenue growth expectations and firm exploratory efforts, future research can explore other
contingency factors that can further qualify the relationship between operational excellence and
long-term value creation. Future studies may also consider developing context-specific
conceptualizations and measurements for operational excellence. The three-dimensional
conceptualization adopted in this paper has been developed for the manufacturing context and
may not be as readily applicable to other contexts. Future studies may explore alternate
conceptualizations and measurements – particularly in the service sector – to help advance our
understanding of the strategic value of operational excellence across different contexts.
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IV.

Essay 3 – Operations orientation pre and post market shifts: When the blessing
turns into a curse

Abstract
Operations management capabilities are executional levers that facilitate the efficient and
effective fulfillment of a firm’s strategic promise. Their propensity to create value is, however,
contingent on the continued appeal of the firm’s strategic promise in the marketplace. When
target customers deem the promise intrinsically appealing, operations management capabilities
serve as compounding levers that enhance customer value creation and facilitate shareholder
value appropriation. When the promise loses its appeal or ceases to trigger customer interest, as
it often does when markets shift, the capabilities lose relevance and become less conducive to
competitive advantage. This exploratory essay discusses the effects of a firm’s pursuit of
operations management capabilities as a primary competitive weapon (i.e., operations
orientation) pre and post market shifts as well as the impact of such orientation on the firm’s
ability to adapt when customer preferences shift in material ways. Three research propositions
are made for future investigation.
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Introduction
Operations management capabilities are potent enablers of customer value creation
(Langley and Holcomb, 1992) and a major source of competitive advantage (Hult et al., 2007).
Companies such as Walmart, McDonald’s, and Dell – to name a few – have notoriously
leveraged such capabilities to propel themselves to the forefront of their respective industries.
Walmart’s ability to effectively and efficiently distribute a wide range of products across an
expansive logistics network has largely contributed to the company’s global leadership in retail
(Barney, 2012). As of 2016, Walmart is by far the world’s largest retailer by revenue, with global
sales surpassing those of the next four competitors combined (Deloitte, 2017). Similarly,
McDonald’s global supremacy in the fast food industry is largely attributable to the company’s
streamlined operations and superior logistics and supply chain management capabilities.
McDonald’s promises its patrons speedy and consistent service anywhere in the world and
leverages superior operations management capabilities and associated operational excellence to
fulfill the promise. In some markets (e.g., the state of Florida in the US), it guarantees orders to
be ready within 60 seconds – a performance unmatched by the closest competition (Wong,
2014). Lastly, Dell’s rise to the top of the PC industry through the 1990’s and early 2000’s is
often attributed to the company’s successful pioneering of a direct-sales model and a build-toorder approach to PC manufacturing; both enabled by superior operations management
capabilities (Gunasekaran and Ngai, 2005).
In recent years, however, all three companies have suffered strong competitive
headwinds due to the emergence of innovative market alternatives with more attractive customer
value propositions. Walmart’s dominance in the retail industry is increasingly threatened by
online retailers like Amazon as more shoppers find greater value in the online or mobile
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experience compared to brick-and-mortar stores. McDonald’s value proposition centered around
speed and consistency appears to be losing its appeal next to healthier yet equally accessible
alternatives from competing chains such as Subway (e.g., Kowitt, 2014, Torres, 2016). And
Dell’s leadership in the PC market has long been eroded due to the company’s failure to adapt its
operations and supply chain management capabilities to the laptop market after a longstanding
domination in the desktop segment (e.g., Darlin, 2006; Knowledge@Wharton, 2007).
Many of the challenges faced by these three companies—and others in similar
situations—seem to be, at least partly, due to a lack of fit between legacy operations
management capabilities and a new market reality. All three companies appear to have been
blindsided by major market shifts caused by the emergence of alternative value propositions that
rendered their own less attractive in the marketplace. As consumer preferences shifted, the
companies’ legacy operations management capabilities became less relevant and, hence, less
conducive to competitive advantage. Walmart’s ability to efficiently and effectively move
product in pallets and case packs from manufacturers to stores through distribution centers
proved of limited value in the online channel where products needed to be picked, packed, and
shipped in individual units and delivered to customer-designated locations. Similarly, Dell’s
mass-customization strategy that proved effective in the desktop segment could not be replicated
in the laptop market where the finished product was more compact and less amenable to delayed
differentiation.
In this essay, I explore a key mechanism that causes firms to grow overinvested in
obsolete operations management capabilities at the expense of strategic foresight and market
adaptation. Market stability is suggested as a double-edged sword that, on the one hand,
facilitates the successful leverage of operations management capabilities for enhanced customer
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value creation and shareholder value appropriation and, on the other hand, causes firms to
potentially overestimate the sustainability of such benefits which may, ultimately, have negative
ramifications for a firm’s ability to adapt to subsequent changes in market conditions. In this
essay, I first discuss the value creation potential of operations management capabilities. Then I
discuss the proposed mechanism through which firms grow overinvested in obsolete operations
management capabilities at the expense of strategic foresight and market adaptation. Three
research propositions are made accordingly.

Operations management capabilities and value creation
Operations management capabilities are executional levers that enable the efficient and
effective fulfillment of an organization’s strategic promise (Adam and Swamidass, 1989;
Mentzer et al., 2008). Their propensity to create value is, however, contingent on the continued
appeal of the organization’s promise in the marketplace. When target customers deem the
promise intrinsically appealing, operations management capabilities serve as compounding
levers (cf. Figure 1) that enhance customer value creation (e.g., affordability, service
differentiation) and facilitate shareholder value appropriation (e.g., profitability).
Figure 1 – Operations management capabilities as compounding levers for customer value
creation and shareholder value appropriation
Executional Levers

Core Competency

Competitive Advantage
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When the promise loses its appeal or ceases to trigger customer interest, as it often does
when markets shift, operations management capabilities that used to serve as valuable
compounding levers become less relevant – simply because a promise deemed intrinsically
unattractive will remain so regardless of the efficiency and effectiveness with which it is
fulfilled.
The value creation of operations management capabilities can therefore be more or less
transient depending on the level of stability4 in a firm’s product-market. Many scholars have
argued that such capabilities are more likely to be beneficial under stable market conditions
where a firm’s promise remains relevant for an extended period of time (e.g., Miles et al., 1978;
Benner and Tushman, 2003). Under such conditions, operations management capabilities are
effective in creating and capturing value through incremental process improvements, efficiency
enhancements, and service differentiation (Ahire and Dreyfus, 2000). When markets shift in
material ways, however, an ex-ante focus on operations management capabilities becomes less
conducive to competitive advantage and often turns into a source of rigidity that undermines
organizational adaptation and long-term value creation (Benner and Tushman, 2003).
The fact that the value creation potential of any set of operations management capabilities
is inherently transient has been recognized and extensively addressed by both scholars and
practitioners (Hayes and Upton, 1998). Prior research addressing this risk of obsolescence has

4

Markets are stable as long as no major disruption occurs whereby a dominant value proposition
is existentially challenged. For example, the car market had been stable for decades until the
dominant value proposition of human-driven, internal-combustion-engine vehicles started to be
challenged by new comers offering fully-electric, self-driving vehicles as a more compelling
mode of personal transportation. Similarly, the cell-phone manufacturing industry had been
relatively stable until it was disrupted by the introduction of touch-screen, application-based
smartphones.
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repeatedly prescribed that firms continuously revise and adjust their operational capabilities to
keep pace with changing market dynamics (Brumme et al., 2015). Upton and Hayes (1998) argue
that proper operations management requires ongoing invention to ascertain continued relevance
of key capabilities. Similarly, practitioners acknowledge the need for adaptive capabilities in
operations management. For example, Walmart CEO, Doug McMillon, recently commented that
“retail history is very clear. Those that are unwilling or unable to change go away. (…) To win,
we must run the business well today and change the business for the future” (Walmart, 2015).
However, such adaptability remains extremely challenging to develop and maintain due
to various structural and behavioral inhibitors (e.g., Hayes and Upton, 1998). One such inhibitor,
I argue, is the conditioning mechanism that takes place under stable market conditions.
Essentially, I contend that market stability has a biasing effect on organizational sense-making
(Weick, 1995) whereby firms develop exaggerated associations between a narrow set of
operations management capabilities and sustained competitive advantage. The argument is that
the longer a firm operates under stable market conditions, the more conditioned it becomes to
associating operations management capabilities with operational excellence and superior
performance. As such, market stability is argued to induce a strong operations orientation with a
substantial risk of overinvestment in inferior/obsolete operations management capabilities.
On the risk of overinvestment in obsolete operations management capabilities
An organization’s overinvestment in obsolete operations management capabilities is
inherently accidental; it iteratively and unintentionally develops over time in a self-reinforcing
cycle that takes hold under stable market conditions. When markets are stable, initial investments
in operations management capabilities tend to improve operational excellence and generate
favorable short-term performance outcomes (Benner and Tushman, 2003). As a result,
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organizations are compelled to further invest in the same capabilities in hopes of duplicating the
initially observed performance benefits (Levitt and March, 1988). With more investments,
operational excellence continues to improve and performance gains continue to follow – making
additional investments all the more compelling, and creating momentum for a self-reinforcing
cycle iterating additional investments, operational excellence, and performance gains (cf. Figure
2).

Figure 2 – The virtuous cycle of investments in operations management (OM)
capabilities under stable market conditions
Competitive
Advantage
Operational
Excellence

Investments in
OM Capabilities
Operational
Excellence
Investments in
OM Capabilities
Time
Stable Market Conditions

After a few iterations, the link between operational excellence and performance gains
becomes increasingly perceived within the organization as more systematic than it actually is.
While this overconfidence in the virtuous nature of the cycle may not be problematic under
stable market conditions, it becomes extremely so when markets shift.
When a shift occurs, the virtuous cycle is broken and performance gains no longer follow
from additional investments in existing operations management capabilities. Yet, the
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organization is too conditioned to change course (Walsh and Ungson, 1991). It mindlessly
extrapolates past realizations into the future (Levinthal and March, 1993) and continues to invest,
in an escalation of commitment to old routines that have proven effective in the past but may not
be as effective in a post-shift environment (Staw, 1981). Ultimately, the organization becomes
overinvested in inferior operations management capabilities, and falls into a competency trap as
a result (Levitt and March, 1988).
To illustrate, consider the example of McDonald’s whose promise of speed, taste, and
consistency had been – until very recently – intrinsically appealing to a growing customer base.
As customers showed interest, McDonald’s superior operations and supply chain management
capabilities amplified customer value creation through competitive pricing and service
differentiation and improved shareholder value appropriation through enhanced profitability. In
recent years, however, the company’s promise came under pressure due to the emergence of
healthier market alternatives. A significant portion of the company’s customer base shifted to
healthier eating (Kowitt, 2014) and no longer considered the company’s promise as intrinsically
appealing. Speed and consistency were no longer sufficient to sustain customer interest; many
customers expected fresh and healthy eating, in addition to speed and consistency. This shift in
consumer preferences caused McDonald’s to suffer a significant decline in in same-store sales
(Strom, 2012) as it rendered the company’s existing operations and supply chain management
capabilities less conducive to competitive advantage due to their limited capacity to efficiently
and effectively accommodate locally sourced fresh ingredients.
Yet, after years of successfully leveraging the same speed- and consistency-enabling
operations and supply chain management capabilities, McDonald’s had grown conditioned to
view operational excellence as universally effective in mitigating (almost) all competitive
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challenges. As such, the company’s initial reaction to the decline in same-store sales was to
further invest in operational excellence so as to reduce order processing time (Kowitt, 2014). It
even instituted a 60-second-or-less guarantee whereby customers were promised a free sandwich
if they did not receive their food within 60 seconds (Wong, 2014). But sales continued to
decline. What the company failed to realize was that sales were declining not because orders
were not filled fast enough, but because consumers were shifting to healthier dining options
(Kowitt, 2014). In a sense, the company’s initial operational excellence core competency turned
into a core rigidity and hindered the company’s strategic foresight and market adaptation.
McDonalds eventually recognized the shift in consumer preferences and initiated efforts to
amend its menu accordingly, after many years of maladaptive behavior (Snyder, 2016).
Research propositions
The above discussion addresses some strategic limitations of the pursuit of operations
management capabilities as a means to achieve operational excellence and facilitate superior
customer value creation and shareholder value appropriation. The central argument is that such a
pursuit may be so effective under stable market conditions that it causes organizational sensemaking to grow biased towards an exaggerated association between existing operations
management capabilities and competitive advantage. Market stability is argued to serve as a
double-edged sword that, on the one hand, provides an ideal environment for the effective
leverage of operations management capabilities and associated operational excellence to boost
firm performance and, on the other, causes firms to become overinvested in a narrow set of such
capabilities with negative ramifications on firm strategic foresight and market adaptation. Three
distinct evolutionary dynamics composing this process can be identified as shown in Figure 3.
They develop sequentially before, during, and after structural market shifts, and have the
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potential to collectively increase the risk of rigidity and organizational maladaptation in the face
of radical shifts. In extreme cases, they can lead firms to grow out of sync with their competitive
environments and eventually fade into irrelevance as a result.

Figure 3 – Conceptual model
Length of Pre-shift
Market Stability

P1(+)

P2(+)

P3(+)
Market Shift

Firm Operations
Orientation

(–)

Firm Performance

Phase I: Market stability and operations orientation
Numerous schools of thought in organization theory suggest that firms are largely shaped
by the environment in which they operate (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Fiol and Lyles,
1985; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). Resource dependence theory, for example, suggests that firms
are open systems subject to conflicting pressures from various interest groups and that a key
mission of top management teams is to channel those pressures in a way that best facilitates the
attainment of organizational goals (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). One way top management teams
channel such pressures is by adjusting their attention and resource allocation based on the
intensity of each pressure (Ocasio, 1997). For example, in environments characterized by strong
competitive pressures such that existing value propositions are repeatedly challenged and
dethroned by new ones (e.g., the computing and digital storage industry), top management teams
are compelled to dedicate substantial resources and attention to environmental scanning and
competitive monitoring in order to safeguard their market position and ensure the continued
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relevance of their firm’s value proposition (Miles et al., 1978). Conversely, in more stable
markets where a mainstream value proposition has little to no existential threat to its continued
appeal (e.g., as is the case in the waste management industry), top management teams are
generally less inclined to engage in competitive monitoring and more likely to focus on internal
process improvements and operational excellence as a means to create superior value and help
strengthen their firm’s market position (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001). With such a focus, and
given that process management and associated operational excellence tend to yield satisfactory
results under conditions of market stability (Benner and Tushman, 2003), firms will tend to
gradually gravitate towards a stronger reliance on operations management capabilities as a
primary source of competitive advantage, for as long as their markets remain stable. This is in
line with propositions from the organizational learning literature suggesting that firm conduct
tends to be governed to a large extent by trial-and-error feedback loops whereby past actions that
fail to yield desired outcomes are abandoned and successful ones (e.g., investments in operations
management capabilities under stable market conditions) are repeated (Levitt and March, 1988).
As such, I propose that firms will invest more and more heavily in operations management
capabilities and associated operational excellence as their markets remain stable.
Proposition 1: Market stability will be positively associated with a firm’s pronounced
emphasis on operations management capabilities as a major source of competitive
advantage - i.e., firms will develop a stronger operations orientation the longer their
markets remain stable.
Phase II: Operations orientation and reduced market awareness
As firms develop a stronger operations orientation, they become more concerned with
“the internal control of the firm and the governance of its activities” (Reed et al., 1996, p. 180).
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As such, they tend to design most organizational roles for intra-organizational coordination, with
only limited efforts expended in the development of boundary-spanning communication channels
(Aldrich and Herker, 1977). They also allocate more of their available resources to improving
existing processes than to scanning the environment for competitive threats and market
opportunities (Aldrich and Herker, 1977).
While such an internal focus can be effective in stable market conditions (e.g., Carpenter
and Westphal, 2001; Dean and Sharfman, 1996), it has the potential to significantly impair firm
competitive awareness and adaptive capabilities. Miles et al. (1978) argue that defender firms
with an operations orientation and an internal focus are at the mercy of market stability; they can
only generate positive returns on their narrow focus to the extent that no major market shift
occurs. When a shift occurs, however, firms with such an orientation are often blindsided by the
turn of events and suffer significant performance losses as a result.
Proposition 2: Operations orientation is negatively associated with a firm’s ability to
foresee and/or adapt to structural market shifts
Phase III: Length of pre-shift market stability and firm maladaptive behavior
As discussed earlier, market stability not only induces firms to develop a pronounced
operations orientation but also triggers a self-reinforcing process whereby incremental
investments in operations management capabilities enhance operational excellence, which in turn
strengthens firm competitive advantage. Over time, this iterative cycle starts to act as a
conditioning mechanism that causes firms to ultimately elevate operations management
capabilities and associated operational excellence from a means-to-an-end to an end in and of
itself. In this essay, I argue that the longer a firm’s market remains stable, the stronger the
conditioning gets and the more entrenched the firm’s beliefs in associating a narrow set of
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operations management capabilities with performance gains. As such, length of market stability
is expected to exacerbate firm maladaptive behavior as discussed in proposition 2 above.
Proposition 3: Firm maladaptive behavior (P2) is exacerbated by the length of pre-shift
market stability
Discussion and conclusion
This essay provides a brief account of an evolutionary mechanism that has the potential
to cause firms to grow overinvested in operations management capabilities and associated
operational excellence at the expense of strategic foresight and market adaptation. Such firms are
said to be particularly vulnerable to structural market shifts. In extreme cases, they may be
irreversibly blindsided by unfavorable market developments and may fade into irrelevance as a
result. For example, Blockbuster—the once uncontested dominant of the home movie and video
game rental industry—was blindsided by Netflix despite the former’s superior capabilities in
managing the physical distribution process across an expansive network of brick-and-mortar
stores. Blockbuster was so focused on perfecting its physical distribution operations that it failed
to recognize the opportunities that the internet had to offer. Not only did it lack the strategic
foresight to anticipate the internet’s potential as an effective and efficient distribution platform, it
blindly dismissed its adoption by the competition as a non-threat. Blockbuster’s commitment to
improving its physical-distribution model through operational excellence turned it myopic to
Netflix’s potential to trigger a market shift that would subsequently undermine its (i.e.,
Blockbuster’s) value proposition. It underestimated the internet-based model and went so far as
to decline, in 1999, an offer to take a 49% equity stake in Netflix in exchange for the latter using
the domain name Blockbuster.com (The New York Times Conferences, 2015). This happened at
a time when Blockbuster was a thousand times bigger than Netflix ($5 billion vs. $5 million in
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revenue). A decade and a half later, Blockbuster is out of business and Netflix is an $8.8 billion
company by revenue, $72 billion by market capitalization.
Although not all operations-focused organizations are doomed to ultimately fall out favor
as dramatically as Blockbuster did when markets shift, the risk that they see such an outcome is
proposed to be positively related to the length of stability in the firms’ product-market prior to
the shift. The longer a firm’s market remains stable, the more entrenched its operations
orientation becomes and the weaker its ability to foresee and adapt to structural market shifts
when they occur.
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V.

Conclusion
This dissertation addressed the concept of operational excellence as it relates to firm

performance in the short and long terms. Construed as the ultimate goal of operations
management, operational excellence reflects a firm’s ability to run its day-to-day operations
efficiently, effectively, and profitably (e.g., Kaplan and Norton, 2008; Mentzer et al., 2008;
Treacy and Wiersema, 1993). For a typical brick-and-mortar retailer, operational excellence
would for example entail achieving high on-shelf availability without compromising inventory
efficiency such that a high level of profitability is attained. For a manufacturer, operational
excellence would encompass the same inventory efficiency, but instead of on-shelf availability,
manufacturers would have factors such as conformance quality, production flexibility, and
supply readiness as key ingredients of operational excellence (e.g., Rosenzweig and Easton,
2010).
Although one might expect operational excellence to be unanimously viewed as a
positive achievement for any and all organizations, scholars and practitioners alike have had
nuanced views on the competency’s long-term value creation potential (e.g., Adler et al., 2009;
Benner and Tushman, 2003; Kaplan and Norton, 2008). Diverging views have also been
expressed as to how such excellence is achieved in the first place (e.g., Skinner, 1969; Clark,
1996; Ferdows and De Meyer, 1990). Do companies have to outperform on both efficiency and
effectiveness simultaneously to achieve operational excellence, or should they focus on one or
the other instead? This dissertation addressed these questions and contentious relationships in
three separate essays.
Essay 1 examined the inner dynamics of operational excellence by looking at the
individual and collective effects of efficiency and effectiveness on firm profitability. The goal
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was to assess the respective merits of two conflicting perspectives – the tradeoff and the
cumulative perspectives – on whether firms can successfully improve efficiency and
effectiveness simultaneously. Based on a large dataset of US public manufacturing firms, the
empirical results revealed that most manufacturers experience positive returns on the
simultaneous improvement of efficiency and effectiveness, indicating support for the cumulative
perspective. This operational ambidexterity was found to have a compounding positive effect on
firm profitability above and beyond what can be attributed to individual improvements to either
efficiency or effectiveness in isolation. However, results also showed that the effect of
operational ambidexterity can vary in magnitude and/or significance across industries, indicating
the presence of idiosyncratic industry characteristics influencing the inner dynamics of
operational excellence.
In essay 2, I revisited a key argument in the productivity dilemma literature suggesting
that firms with a pronounced emphasis on operational excellence may do well in the short-term
but may also undergo excessive routinization dynamics at the expense of strategic adaptability
(e.g., Benner and Tushman, 2003). Drawing on signaling theory and using the stock market as
gauge for the long-term value creation potential of operational excellence, essay 2 provided
empirical evidence that the operational competency tends to be viewed by the investment
community as a leading indicator of superior future shareholder value. Results also showed that
the investment community’s positive assessment is contingent on the community’s own
expectations of a firm’s short-term revenue growth prospects and the firm’s research and
development efforts. Short-term revenue growth expectations are found to exert as a dampening
force on the stock market’s positive assessment of the long-term value creation potential of
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operational excellence whereas firm research and development was found to amplify the
market’s positive outlook.
In essay 3, I built on key arguments from the productivity dilemma literature to explore
some strategic limitations to a firm’s pursuit of operational excellence as a major source of
competitive advantage. More specifically, I discussed how market stability can act as a doubleedged sword that, on the one hand, provides an ideal environment for the effective leverage of
operations management capabilities and associated operational excellence; and, on the other
hand, causes firms to become overinvested in a narrow set of such capabilities at the expense of
strategic foresight and market adaptation. I specifically discussed organizational learning
dynamics that can explain why firms tend to gravitate towards operational excellence in periods
of stability and how such a tendency may impair the firm’s ability to anticipate or adapt to
structural market shifts, with negative ramifications on firm long-term survival.
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